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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 17, 1986, President Ronald Reagan announced that he
would nominate the Honorable Antonin Gregory Scalia, from the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
to serve as an associate justice on the United States Supreme Court.
On September 26, 1986, Scalia rose to the High Bench. Scalia had just
turned fifty years young, leaving many conservatives salivating at the
enormous influence President Reagan would have on U.S. policy
beyond his eight-year presidency.
Justice Scalia served nearly thirty years on the Supreme Court.
His influence as a jurist is profound. He is associated with the school
1. See, e.g., Al Kamen, Burger Quits; Rehnquist Chosen to Lead Court; President Intends
to Nominate Appellate Judge Scalia, WASH. POST, June 18, 1986, at Al.
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of legal formalism - a normative belief that judges should logically
apply uncontroversial rules (legalism) to the facts of a case to
determine the outcome in much the same way that a mathematician
would apply true mathematical principles (such as axioms) to either
derive other mathematical principles or draw conclusions.2 It is only
in this way, the formalist believes, that judges will rise above politics
and avoid the rule of person in favor of the rule of law. He is also
strongly associated with textualism, a school of thought whereby the
jurist arrogates the constitutional, statutory, or regulatory text to
prominence over other canons of construction.'
This article uses private-sector labor law cases decided during
Justice Scalia's tenure on the Supreme Court to draw conclusions
about Scalia's labor law legacy and the ways in which his
administrative law jurisprudence influenced his decision making in
those cases. Unlike the great Justice, I do not believe that law can be
reduced to axioms and internal logic. Instead, law is influenced by
context - the context of the case, the context of who is deciding the
case, and the context of the legal system itself. Denial of such context
often means that justice is denied. Accordingly, in part II,
Background, I explore the biographical details of Justice Scalia's life
and also important events that occurred during his lifetime to shed
light on his jurisprudence. While Scalia often ignored context, which
he considered outside the law's four corners, context including
historical events and biographical details of his own life still
influenced both who he was as a justice and how the case ultimately
came to him for decision.
Part III, Scalia's Labor Law Legacy, is the heart of this article.
With the knowledge that labor law is public law and cannot be
understood outside the context of labor law's relationship to
administrative law, Part III is divided into three sections along the
lines of administrative law principles. Section III.A discusses Scalia's
labor law cases on separation of powers. Section III.B delves into the
2. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 25 (1997); Richard A.
Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution,
37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 182-86 (1986); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Jurisprudence of Legal
Formalism, 16 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 583 (1993); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On
the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L. J. 949, 952 (1988) ("For the formalist, the law's
inner rationality reflects the possibility of its coherence.").
3. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV.
1509 (1998); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in THE TANNER LECTURES ON
HUMAN VALUES 77, 88 (1995).
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Court's relationship to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB
or Board) in interpreting the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
through the Chevron lens. Section III.C explores the Court's review
of the Board's factual findings through the substantial-evidence test
and the extent to which those views affected labor law jurisprudence.
II. BACKGROUND: JUSTICE IN THE MAKING
Antonin Gregory Scalia (Nino) was born on March 11, 1936, in
Trenton, New Jersey, to an immigrant Italian-Catholic father and
second-generation Italian-Catholic mother.4 It was a year of many
firsts, especially, but not exclusively, in the realm of technological and
commercial development. The Hoover Dam was completed. The first
alcohol power plant was formed. The N.Y. Herald Tribune became
the first newspaper to microfilm its current issues. The United States
army adopted semi-automatic rifles. A Florida race track installed the
first ever photo-finish camera. Radium E became the first radioactive
substance produced synthetically. The Hindenburg launched
commercial service across the North Atlantic, between Germany and
the United States. Not to be outdone, air flight earned several firsts:
the first transatlantic round-trip air flight; the first commercial flight
from the mainland U.S. to Hawaii. Aviation gasoline was produced
commercially in New Jersey for the first time. The year witnessed
medical firsts such as intravenous injection of a human with a
radioisotope, X-ray photo of arterial circulation, and administration
of radioactive isotope medicine. Parking meters were invented. The
ICC issued its first common carrier license. The United Auto
Workers Union staged its first sit-down strike at the Fisher Body
Plant in Detroit. Canada elected its first female mayor. The Federal
Register published its first issue. The United States experienced
record low and record high temperatures; twelve of those record
highs still stand today.6
4. The personal details of Justice Scalia's life are very well documented. I used the
following sources: Antonin Scalia, OYEZ, IIT CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW, <https://
www.oyez.org/justices/antonin scalia> (last visited Mar. 17, 2017); Paris Schutz, University of
Chicago Reflects on Justice Antonin Scalia's Death, CHICAGOTONIGHT (Feb. 15, 2016, 1:54 PM),
<http://chicagotonight.wttw.com/2016/02/15/university-chicago-reflects-justice-antonin-scalias-
death> (last visited Mar. 17, 2017).
5. A list of the historical events and those described in the following three paragraphs can
be found at Historical Events in 1936, ON THIS DAY, <http://www.onthisday.com/events
/date/1936> (last visited Mar. 20, 2017) and Historical Events in 1936 (Part 2), ON THIS DAY,
<http://www.onthisday.com/events/date/1936?p=2> (last visited Mar. 20, 2017).
6. North Dakota (-60o F) and South Dakota (-58o F) set record low temperatures. Sixteen
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It was also a year of many sports and entertainment firsts and
significant events. Billboard published its first music hit parade. The
Baseball Hall of Fame elected its first players, which included Babe
Ruth and Ty Cobb. The National Football League conducted its first
draft. The first ski jumping tournament was held. Willy den Ouden
set a women's world record (1:04.6) in the 100-meter free style, which
was not broken for twenty years. Daytona Beach, Florida, hosted the
first stock car race. The first professional baseball game in Japan was
played, while the Olympics held its first basketball game. Nazi
Germany hosted the Fourth Winter Olympic Games and the
Eleventh Summer Olympic Games in Berlin. The first issue of Life
magazine was published. The first live panda cub entered the U.S.
Later in the year, the first giant panda, Su Lin, travelled to the States.
The first superhero, the Phantom, appeared in cartoon strips. The
Radio Corporation of America showed the first television program.
The British Broadcasting Company in London broadcasted the first
radio quiz show, first television gardening show, and first high-
definition television. The Canadian Broadcasting Company was
established.
Not everything, however, contributed to an optimistic
atmosphere of never-ending progress. While Franklin Delano
Roosevelt was in his first term as president, (later that year, he won
re-election in a landslide), and trying to lead the United States out of
the Depression, Europe was preparing itself for war. British King
George V died; Edward VIII succeeded to the throne but abdicated
later in that year to marry American Wallace Simpson. His brother,
George VII, ascended to the throne and would reign through World
War II and until his death when his daughter, Queen Elizabeth II,
succeeded him. Hitler announced the building of the Volkswagon
(the People's Car). Japan experienced a military coup. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Second Neutrality Act, extending
for fourteen months the 1935 Neutrality Act's prohibition on trading
in arms with all warring parties. Italian Prime Minister Benito
Mussolini described the alliance between Italy and Germany as the
states - Maryland (1090 F), New Jersey (1100 F), Pennsylvania (1110 F), Michigan (112 F), West
Virginia (112 F), Louisiana (114 F), Minnesota (114 F), Wisconsin (114 F), Indiana (1160 F),
Iowa (117 o F), Missouri (1180 F), Nebraska (1180 F), Arkansas (120 F), Oklahoma (120 o F),
Kansas (1210 F), and North Dakota (1210 F) - hit record highs. Historical Events in 1936, supra
note 5; Historical Events in 1936 (Part 2), supra note 5.
7. See Chris Heller, How America Fell in Love with the Giant Panda, SMITHSONIAN (Sept.
21, 2015), <http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/how-america-fell-love-giant-panda-18095
6692/?no-ist>.
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Axis, around which the other European nations would revolve. In
November, the thirty-month Battle of Madrid began. Perhaps most
ominously, we were only three years away from the time that German
scientists would learn how to split a uranium atom - the precursor to
the atomic bomb.
On March 11, 1936, the NLRB, still in its infancy at 249 days old,
decided one case - one of 107 cases that it would ultimately decide
that year. The case, Atlanta Woolen Mills, concerned a cotton and
wool textile manufacturing company that allegedly supported a sham
union called the Good Will Club to replace the employees' chosen
representative, Local 2307, United Textile Workers of America, by
requiring its employees to join the Club and by firing supporters of
Local 2307. The Board found that the Good Will Club was a labor
organization 9 within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA or the Wagner Act),0 but that the company did not
unlawfully support the Good Will Club." The Board further found
that the company violated the NLRB by discharging some of the
employees.12 The case is known primarily for establishing the
principle that an organization less formal than a union could meet the
definition of labor organization within the meaning of the NLRA. On
April 12, 1937, when Scalia was thirteen months old, the Supreme
Court held the NLRA constitutional. 13
Scalia grew up during the Great Depression, World War II, the
invention of the atomic bomb, the initiation of the Cold War, the
8. 1 N.L.R.B. 316, 316 (1936).
9. Id. at 318.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 151-59 (2012) (popularly known as the Wagner Act).
11. Atlanta Woolen Mills, 1 N.L.R.B. at 320-21, 326 (citing section 8(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(2)
(1940) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2012))).
12. Id. at 320-26 (citing section 8(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(3) (1940) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2012))).
13. The following five cases, all decided on the same day, upheld the NLRA's
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 25-32 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality of the NLRA in
the context of the fourth largest producer of steel in the United States); NLRB v. Fruehauf
Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49, 53 (1937) (same; in the context of "the manufacture, assembly, sale,
and distribution of commercial trailers and of trailer parts and accessories"); NLRB v.
Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing, 301 U.S. 58, 72 (1937) (same; in the context of "in the
purchase of raw materials and the manufacture, sale and distribution of men's clothing");
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 128 (1937) (same; in the context of a news clearing
house and news supplier using interstate and foreign communication channels); Wash., Va. &
Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142, 144 (1937) (same; in the context of an interstate
motorbus company, which transported passengers between the District of Columbia and
Virginia).
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Korean War, and McCarthyism.14 He grew up knowing two presidents
- Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman. He started
college just after the Korean War ended. He attended college and law
school while Dwight Eisenhower was president - the first Republican
to hold that post since March 4, 1933, when Herbert Hoover left
office, three years before Scalia was born.
In 1957, Scalia graduated first in his class at Georgetown.1 5 By
that time, twenty-two years had passed since Congress had enacted
the Wagner Act and ten years since it passed the Taft-Hartley
amendments. In that year, the Court decided three NLRB cases.16 All
three were statutory construction cases. First, Lion Oil Company,
dealt with the Board's interpretation of ambiguous language in one of
the provisos to Section 8(d)'s definition of collective bargaining,
which prohibits parties to a collective-bargaining agreement from
terminat[ing] or modify[ing] such contract, unless the party desiring
such termination or modification ... (4) continues in full force and
effect, without resorting to strike or lockout, all the terms and
conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after
such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract,
whichever occurs later .... 7
An employee who strikes within the specified sixty-day period
loses his status as an employee for the purposes of sections 8, 9, and
10 of the Act." The Court upheld the Board's construction of the
term "expiration date," such that "a strike in support of [midterm]
modification demands [that] occurs after the date on which such
modifications may become effective - and after the 60-day notice
period has elapsed - but prior to the terminal date of the contract" is
not prohibited by section 8(d). 19 Second, Office Employees
International Union, Local No. 11,20 dealt with the Board's
14. On McCarthyism, see KEVIN HILLSTROM, DEFINING MOMENTS: MCCARTHYISM AND
THE COMMUNIST THREAT (2011); William S. White, McCarthy Issue Is Far Bigger than the
Senator Himself, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 6, 1954, at E4 (defining McCarthyism as "an assault upon the
American tradition or a dedicated hunt for subversives who might destroy that tradition").
15. The biographical facts in this paragraph were taken from two sources: Maira Garcia &
Amisha Padnani, Justice Antonin Scalia: His Life and Career, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2016),
<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/02/14/us/scalia-timeline-listy.html>; Antonin Scalia:
Supreme Court Justice, Lawyer (1936-2016), BIOGRAPHY, <http://www.biography.com/people/
antonin-scalia-9473091#synopsis> (last visited Mar. 20, 2017).
16. See NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282 (1957); Office Emp. Int'l Union, Local No. 11,
AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957); NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No 449, Int'1
Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs Warehousemen, & Helpers of Am. AFL, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(4) (2012) (emphasis added).
18. Id. The final sentence of this part of section 8(d) has since been amended.
19. See Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. at 285, 287-93.
20. See 353 U.S. at 316-20.
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construction of the statutory definition of employer. The Court held
that the Board acted outside its discretion in concluding that unions,
when acting as employers, are not covered by NLRA section 2(2),
which excludes "labor organizations (other than when acting as an
employer)" from the definition of employer."21 The Court explained
that the NLRA's plain language and its legislative history compelled
that conclusion. It further held that the Board did not have discretion
to refuse to assert its jurisdiction over an entire class of employers. 22
Third, Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449,23 dealt with a statutory
silence regarding the conflicting interests between the union and
employers in a multiemployer bargaining context. The Court upheld
the Board's rule that "nonstruck members of a multi-employer
bargaining association" did not act unlawfully "when, during contract
negotiations, they temporarily locked out their employees as a
defense to a union strike against one of their members which
imperiled the employers' common interest in bargaining on a group
basis." 24
The years 1960 and 1961 were big years for both Scalia and for
labor law. In 1960, Scalia graduated from Harvard Law School and
married Radcliffe student, Maureen McCarthy, with whom he later
had nine children. 25 The following year, he began his career as a
lawyer at the firm, Jones, Day, Cockley & Reavis in Cleveland,
Ohio.26 The Court also decided fourteen NLRB cases in those years -
five in 196027 and eight in 196128 - not to mention the Steelworkers
21. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)).
22. See id.
23. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, Int'1 Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs
Warehousemen, & Helpers of Am. AFL, 353 U.S. 87, 89, 97 (1957).
24. See id.
25. The biographical facts in this paragraph were taken from two sources: Garcia &
Padnani, supra note 15; Antonin Scalia: Supreme Court Justice, Lawyer (1936-2016), supra note
15. Radcliffe College was the all-women's liberal arts institution and functional equivalent of the
all-men's Harvard College at Harvard University. See Helen Lefkowitz Horowitz, Lecture on
the History of Women at Harvard in Honor of Harvard's 375th Anniversary: It's Complicated:
375 Years of Women at Harvard (April 23, 2012), available at <https://www.radcliffe.harvard.
edu/news/in-news/remarks-its-complicated-375-years-women-harvard>.
26. See The Reavis Era, JONES DAY, <http://www.jonesday.com/principlesandvalues/firm
history/therevisera/> (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
27. See Commc'ns Wkrs. of Am. AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 479 (1960); NLRB v. Ins.
Agents' Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); Local Lodge No. 1424 v. NLRB, 362 U.S.
411 (1960); NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398 (1960); NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffeurs,
Helpers, Local Union No. 639, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
28. See NLRB v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp., 368 U.S. 318 (1961); Int'l Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961); Local 761, Int'1 Union of Elec.,
Radio & Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961); Int'1 Typo. Union v. NLRB,
365 U.S. 705 (1961); NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961); Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of
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Trilogy.29
In 1967, Scalia began his teaching career at the University of
Virginia.30 In that year, the Court decided seven NLRB cases. All
seven cases were major victories for unions and working class people.
These cases established the union's right to enforce work-
preservation clauses; the employer's duty to furnish information to
unions where the information is relevant to processing a grievance;
the striker's right to reinstatement before new employees are hired;
the union's right to fine members who crossed picket lines; and the
Board's authority to interpret collective-bargaining agreements to
determine whether an employer unlawfully implemented unilateral
changes without notice or bargaining with the union.31 Perhaps most
significantly of all, the Court affirmed the principle that "conduct,
[which] is so 'inherently destructive of employee interests'. . . may be
deemed proscribed without need for proof of an underlying improper
motive."3
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961); Local
60, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651 (1961);
NLRB v. Radio & Television Broad. Eng'rs Union, 364 U.S. 573 (1961).
29. See Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.574 (1960); Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.564
(1960). For a discussion of the Steelworkers Trilogy, see Anne Marie Lofaso, Deflategate:
What's the Steelworkers Trilogy Got to Do with It? 6 BERKELEY J. ENT. & SPORTS L (2017).
30. The biographical facts in this paragraph were taken from two sources: Garcia &
Padnani, supra note 15; Antonin Scalia: Supreme Court Justice, Lawyer (1936-2016), supra note
15; see also Our History, Former Faculty, Scalia, Antonin (1967-1974), UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF
LAW, <http://libguides.law.virginia.edu/faculty/scalia> (last updated Dec. 7, 2016, 12:00 PM).
31. See NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 380 (1967) (holding that, absent
substantial business justification, employer must rehire former strikers before hiring new
employees where "employees continued to make known their availability and desire for
reinstatement, and that 'at all times' respondent intended to resume full production to
reactivate the jobs and to fill them"); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 192-93
(1967) (holding that a union may lawfully threaten and impose fines, and bring suit for the
collection of those fines, against members who crossed the union's picket line to work during an
authorized strike against their employer) ; NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 32-
33 (1967) (holding that employer violates § 8(a)(3) and (1) - even in the absence of union
animus - when it refuses to pay striking employees vacation benefits accrued under a
terminated collective-bargaining agreement while announcing its intention to pay such benefits
to striker replacements, returning strikers, and nonstrikers who had been at work on a certain
date during the strike); Houston Insulation Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 664, 666-67
(1967) (holding that Union A may lawfully order its members not to handle pre-cut steel bands
where such work was normally handled in shop by members of Union B); Nat'l Woodwork
Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 635-38 (1967) (holding that work-preservation clauses do
not violate § 8(e)'s prohibition on hot-cargo agreements); NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S.
432, 439 (1967) (holding that an employer has a duty under § 8(a)(5) to furnish union with
information necessary to determine whether to file a grievance); NLRB v. C & C Plywood
Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 428-30 (1967) (concluding that the Board may interpret a collective-
bargaining agreement to determine whether an employer implemented unilateral changes in
violation of § 8(a)(5) and (1)).
32. See Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. at 33.
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Scalia took a brief hiatus from the academic life to enter public
service in 1972, when President Nixon appointed Scalia General
Counsel for the Office of Telecommunications Policy. There, Scalia
helped to develop policy for the cable TV industry.33 He was later
appointed Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal
Counsel; in that role he provided congressional committee testimony
about executive privilege for the Ford Administration. He also
argued as amicus curiae for the United States and won his only case
before the Supreme Court, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba.34
In 1972, the year Scalia entered public service, the Supreme
Court decided five NLRB cases. 35 These cases declared some victories
for employers and some for unions. NLRB v. Burns International
Security Services, Inc. established the important labor law principle
that a successor employer was not required to subsume the terms and
conditions of its predecessor's collective-bargaining agreement,
36
although the successor must bargain with the incumbent union.
Central Hardware Company v. NLRB reaffirmed NLRB v. Babcock
& Wilcox's principle that employers were not necessarily required to
yield their property rights to nonemployee union organizers.37 Twenty
years later, the Court would draw a much firmer, less flexible line in
the sand, when it reaffirmed that principle in Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB,
33. During this time of public service, Scalia was on leave from the University of Virginia.
Between 1977 and 1982, Scalia returned to academia primarily teaching at the University of
Chicago School of Law. See Former Faculty, Scalia, Antonin (1967-1974), supra note 30.
34. 425 U.S. 682 (1976). The biographical facts in this paragraph were taken from two
sources: Garcia & Padnani, supra note 15; Antonin Scalia: Supreme Court Justice, Lawyer
(1936-2016), supra note 15.
35. See NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Workers Union of Am., Local 1029,
AFL-CIO, 409 U.S. 213, 217 (1972) (union is prohibited from fining members for lawfully
resigning from the union); NLRB v. Int'l Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 52-53 (1972) (upholding
Board's finding that employer violated Section 8(a)(3) when it refused to reinstate strikers who
had offered to return to work and no permanent replacement workers had yet been hired);
Cent. Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 547 (1972) (rejecting Board's application of Logan
Valley Plaza's principle - that the First Amendment sometimes applies to expressive conduct on
private property - to nonemployee union organizing on an employer's private parking lot;
remanding for application of Babcock & Wilcox to the facts); NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs.,
Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 278, 281-82, 284 (1972) (holding that, although a successor employer has no
obligation to retain the collective-bargaining agreement between it and its predecessor, it must
bargain with the incumbent over terms and conditions of employment); NLRB v. Scrivener, 405
U.S. 117, 120-21 (1972) (upholding the Board's interpretation of Section 8(a)(4), which prohibits
employers from "discharg[ing] or otherwise discriminat[ing] against an employee because he
has filed charges or given testimony under [the NLRA]" as "encompass[ing] discharge of
employees for giving written sworn statements to Board field examiners").
36. 406 U.S. at 284.
37. 407 U.S. at 544-45, 547-48 (citing NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112
(1956)).
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a case onto which Scalia signed.38 In NLRB v. Scrivener, the Court
accepted the Board's extension of section 8(a)(4)'s anti-retaliation
protections 39 to those who give sworn statements to Board agents
during the investigatory stages of a case.40 In NLRB v. International
Van Lines, the Court upheld the principle that employers must
reinstate both economic and unfair labor practice strikers who have
not been permanently replaced. 41 NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board,
Textile Workers, Local 1029, sharpened the holding of NLRB v. Allis-
Chalmers Manufacturing Company - although unions may fine their
members (Allis-Chalmers) they may not fine those who lawfully
relinquish their membership (Granite State Joint Board).42
President Reagan nominated Scalia to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, where he was sworn in
on August 17, 1982. In that year, the Supreme Court decided two
important NLRB cases.43 Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB is
a case about the construction proviso to NLRA Section 8(e),' which
exempts construction industry employers from its general prohibition
against labor-management agreements requiring the employer to
cease doing business with a third party. It is more famous, however,
for the procedural rule it applied under Section 10(e), which provides
that "[n]o objection that has not been urged before the Board ...
shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge
such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary
circumstances." 45 That section bars judicial review where the party
seeking court review fails to raise the objection to the Board in the
first instance. In Woelke, the employer asked the Supreme Court to
reverse the lower court's "holding that unions do not violate §
8(b)(4)(A) when they picket to obtain a subcontracting clause
sheltered by the construction industry proviso." 46 Applying Section
10(e)'s plain language, the Court held that the lower court was
"without jurisdiction to consider that question" because "[t]he issue
38. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
39. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2012).
40. 405 U.S. at 120-21.
41. 409 U.S. 48, 52-53 (1972).
42. 409 U.S. 213, 215-17 (1972) (citing NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 196
(1967)).
43. See Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645 (1982); Charles D.
Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404 (1982).
44. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (2012).
45. Id. § 160(e).
46. Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc., 456 U.S. at 665.
2017]1 23
24 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 21:13
was not raised during the proceedings before the Board, either by the
General Counsel or by [the employer]."47 The Court further explained
that the "§ 10(e) bar applie[d] even though the Board held that the
picketing was not banned by § 8(b)(4)(A)."4 8 In such cases, the
employer "could have objected to the Board's decision in a petition
for reconsideration or rehearing" to preserve the question. "The
failure to do so prevents consideration of the question by the
courts."49
The second NLRB case decided in 1982, Charles D. Bonanno
Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB, is a pre-Chevronso Chevron case. There,
a member of a multiemployer bargaining unit withdrew when the
parties hit impasse in negotiations." At the time this case was
decided, it had been long settled that a multiemployer bargaining unit
member may "withdraw prior to the date set for negotiation of a new
contract or the date on which negotiations actually begin, provided
that adequate notice is given."5 2 But "[o]nce negotiations for a new
contract have commenced, . . . withdrawal is permitted only if there is
'mutual consent' or 'unusual circumstances' exist."5 3 The case
presented the legal question whether impasse was an unusual
circumstance sufficient to permit withdrawal. The Court agreed with
the Board that impasse does not constitute an unusual circumstance.54
Four years later, Scalia himself would be deciding cases such as
these. The NLRA was over half a century old at this point. Because
the Board had chosen to use its adjudicatory powers, rather than its
rulemaking authority, to regulate industrial and labor relations, many
administrative law principles were decided or created within the
context of labor law cases. Indeed, the Board became the model for
policy making through adjudication in much the same way as the
Securities and Exchange Commission has become the model for
policy making through rule making. In the context of the SEC
exercising its policy making powers, the Court long ago explained:
47. Id.
48. Id. at 667.
49. Id. at 666 (citing Int'1 Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S.
276, 281, n.3 (1975)).
50. The full name of the case is Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and it established a doctrine of deference to administrative agency
interpretations of statutes that those agencies enforce.
51. Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 406, 407 (1982).
52. Id. at 410-11.
53. Id. at 411.
54. See id. at 412.
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Since the Commission, unlike a court, does have the ability to make
new law prospectively through the exercise of its rule-making
powers, it has less reason to rely upon ad hoc adjudication to
formulate new standards of conduct within the framework of the
[statute]. The function of filling in the interstices of the Act should
be performed, as much as possible, through this quasi-legislative
promulgation of rules to be applied in the future. But any rigid
requirement to that effect would make the administrative process
inflexible and incapable of dealing with many of the specialized
problems which arise. . . . Not every principle essential to the
effective administration of a statute can or should be cast
immediately into the mold of a general rule. Some principles must
await their own development, while others must be adjusted to
meet particular, unforeseeable situations. In performing its
important functions in these respects, therefore, an administrative
agency must be equipped to act either by general rule or by
individual order. To insist upon one form of action to the exclusion
of the other is to exalt form over necessity.
[P]roblems may arise in a case which the administrative agency
could not reasonably foresee, problems which must be solved
despite the absence of a relevant general rule. Or the agency may
not have had sufficient experience with a particular problem to
warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule.
Or the problem may be so specialized and varying in nature as to
be impossible of capture within the boundaries of a general rule. In
those situations, the agency must retain power to deal with the
problems on a case-to-case basis if the administrative process is to
be effective. There is thus a very definite place for the case-by-case
evolution of statutory standards. And the choice made between
proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one
that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative
agency.
The NLRB lives by this creed, making nearly all of its
policymaking through "case-by-case evolution of statutory standards"
and "individual, ad hoc litigation." As a result, the NLRA had a long
line of interpretive case progeny by the time Scalia reached the High
Bench. In light of the New Deal advocates' penchant for purposivism
in statutory construction and judicial deference to the Board under
pre-Chevron Chevron jurisprudence, this long line of labor cases
would have reached Scalia in a manner that he would likely have
viewed as messy from the textualist's point of view. His instinct surely
would have been to clean up that mess. But there would be obstacles.
55. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (citing REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S.
Doc. No. 77-8, at 29 (1941)).
56. Id. at 202-03 (citing CBS v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 421 (1942)).
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While the role of stare decisis in reviewing administrative agency
cases is complex," it still would serve as a hindrance to change at the
reviewing court level." The following part describes Scalia's attempt
to straighten up labor jurisprudence, by making it more closely reflect
what Scalia viewed as the plain meaning of the statutory text.
III. SCALIA'S LABOR LAw LEGACY
During Justice Scalia's nearly thirty-year term, the Court decided
nineteen private-sector labor law cases to which the NLRB was a
party. Three cases dealt primarily with the limits of government
power - Did the government - meaning the Court,59 the NLRB,60 or
the President61  - have authority to act? Sixteen cases dealt with
agency discretion: Is the NLRB's construction of the NLRA
reasonable? 62 Does substantial evidence support its factual findings? 63
57. Under basic administrative law principles, an agency may change its interpretation of
the statute it has been charged with administering and therefore oscillate among various policies
so long as it gives reasons for its changes. See Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor
Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 163 (1982); see also Chenery Corp., 332 U. S.
at 194; SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80 (1943).
58. "'Once we have determined a statute's clear meaning, we adhere to that determination
under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency's later interpretation of the statute
against our prior determination of the statute's meaning."' Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S.
527, 536-37 (1992) (quoting Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131
(1990)).
59. See NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 23, AFL-CIO, 484 U.S. 112
(1987).
60. See New Process Steel v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674 (2010).
61. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct 2550 (2014).
62. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149-52 (2002) (upholding
the Board's construction of the statutory term employee as including undocumented workers
but finding that federal immigration law prohibited the Board from awarding backpay as a
remedy); NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 721 (2001) (holding that the
Board's construction of the statutory term "independent judgment" is not reasonable); Holly
Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 401 (1996) (upholding the Board's conclusion that live-haul
workers were employee entitled to the statutory protections of the NLRA rather than being
exempted agricultural workers); NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1995)
(upholding the Board's construction of the statutory term employee as including paid union
organizers); NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America, 511 U.S. 571, 581-82 (1994)
(holding that Board's construction of the statutory term, "in the interest of the employer" is not
a reasonable interpretation of the NLRA).
63. Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998).
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Of these cases, Scalia penned two majority opinions,' five
concurrences,65 and one dissent.66 He joined the majority ten times, 67
concurred in judgment six times, 68 dissented twice, 69 and split the
* * 70issues in one case.
These statistics, standing alone, reveal little about Scalia's record
regarding those wishing to exercise their human right to free
association.71 Even a close reading of these cases reveals only a small
part of Scalia's views on labor; there are simply too few cases.
Patterns, however, do emerge.72 First, Scalia was wedded to a strong
64. See Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. at 706; Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc., 522
U.S. at 359.
65. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2550; BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 537
(2002) (Scalia, J., concurring); ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 326 (1994) (Scalia,
J., concurring); NLRB v. Int'1 Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 340, 481 U.S. 573, 596 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring); NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, AFL-
CIO, 484 U.S. 112, 133 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
66. See NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Sci., Inc., 494 U.S. 775 (1990).
67. Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion ten times. See New Process Steel, L.P. v.
NLRB, 560 U.S. 674 (2010); Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002);
Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. at 706; Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc., 522 U.S. at 359;
Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781 (1996); NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc.,
516 U.S. 85 (1995); NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571 (1994); Lechmere,
Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992); Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606 (1991); Fall River
Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987).
68. He concurred in judgment six times. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 588 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment
without opinion); supra note 65, for the five cases in which Scalia wrote a concurring opinion.
69. See Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 211 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); id. at 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting); NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Sci., Inc., 494 U.S. 775,
801 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. See Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 409 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
71. International Labour Standards on Freedom of Association, ILO, <http://www.ilo.org/
global/standards/subj ects-covered-by-international-labour-standards/freedom-of-association/la
ng-en/index.htm> (last visited Mar. 25, 2017); Constitution of the International Labour
Organization pmbl., Oct. 9, 1946, 62 Star. 3490, 3490, 15 U.N.T.S. 40, 40; Declaration
Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International Labor Organization (Declaration of
Philadelphia) 1944, art. 1, [Oct. 9, 1946, 15 U.N.T.S. 35], available at <http://www.ilo.org/pub
lic/english/about/iloconst.htm#annex>; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 (1948); Int'l Labour Org., International Labour Conference: ILO
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and Annex, June 18, 1998, 37 I.L.M.
1233, 1237.
72. The following opinions decided during Scalia's tenure are not discussed in this paper
because they do not reveal much about Scalia's legacy: Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 517
U.S. 781 (1996); Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606 (1991); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 588 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment without opinion); Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27
(1987). In Auciello, the Court unanimously upheld as reasonable the Board's conclusion that an
employer violates sections 8(a)(1) and (5) when it disavows a collective-bargaining agreement
because of a good-faith doubt about a union's majority status at the time the contract where the
employer learned about the facts giving rise to doubt before the union accepted the contract.
517 U.S. at 783-85. In American Hospital Ass'n, the Court unanimously upheld the Board's rule
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view of separation of powers with the judiciary often playing a
significantly stronger role in the administrative law context than most
of the other justices would ever have accepted. Second, Scalia merged
his textualism with Chevron to expand the role of Chevron prong one
- plain meaning73 - at the expense of Chevron prong two - judicial
deference to the agency's interpretation of statutory ambiguities and
silences.74 Third, in cases where the plain text argument was too much
of a stretch, Scalia was comfortable with using the substantial
evidence test to push back on agency action. These three patterns
coalesce to form a Scalia-esque brand of labor law, where Scalia
imposed his world view and judicial philosophy on labor relations, a
view that ironically usurps the power of the administrative agency.
A. Separation of Powers and the Government's Limited Authority
to Act
The NLRB is an administrative agency created by Congress as
part of the New Deal. While Scalia served on the Supreme Court, he
heard three cases dealing with the government's authority and power
in relation to the NLRB. Taken together, these cases support the
"applicable to acute care hospitals... that eight, and only eight, units shall be appropriate in
any such hospital." 499 U.S. at 608. The Court rejected the employer's challenges that (1) the
Board lacked statutory authority to promulgate the rule under section 9(b); (2) the rule was
contrary to congressional intent; and (3) the rule was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 608-09. In
DeBartolo, the Court refused to defer to the Board's interpretation of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
(which forbids a union to "threaten, coerce, or restrain" any person to cease doing business with
another person), as applied to union handbilling in a Mall asking customers to boycott Mall
stores, because such interpretation raised serious constitutional issues under the First
Amendment. 485 U.S. at 573-74.
73. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)
("When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.").
74. See id. at 843 (If ... the court [under Chevron prong one] determines Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute.").
75. Professor Eric Posner recently made a similar, albeit more general, observation: "Scalia
refused to acknowledge that originalism does not enable justices to decide cases neutrally. If
they choose to adopt this methodology, and manage to figure out a way to make it constrain
them, they are committed to enforcing mostly 18th-century values - which are, by definition,
conservative."Eric Posner, The Tragedy of Antonin Scalia, SLATE (Feb. 15, 2016, 1:10 PM),
<http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/j urisprudence/2016/02/the-tragedy-of_antoni
n scalia.html.>
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well-accepted view that the United States federal government is a
government of limited powers with checks and balances that serve to
retard legal change and protect individual liberties.
1. Limits on the Court's Power to Review Agency Actions
The original NLRA, popularly known as the Wagner Act, did
not create a legal separation of prosecutorial and adjudicative powers.
Combining these functions, although legal, presented "a delicate
matter so far as public confidence in the integrity and independence
of the final decision was concerned." 76 In particular, NLRB advocates
were concerned about the possibility of prejudgment and "the
danger ... that the Board's decisions might 'lie under the suspicion of
being rationalizations of the preliminary findings' which the Board 'in
the role of prosecutor, presented to itself."'" To avoid these
problems, the Board "devise[d] a system of effective internal
'separation of functions' by isolating those of its staff who performed
the characteristic tasks of a prosecutor from those whose work was an
incident of the adjudicative process."
Notwithstanding the fact that reviewing courts upheld the
integrity of the Board's internal procedural mechanisms from
employer challenges, 7 9 the newly minted Republican-majority
Eightieth Congress sought to substantially reconfigure the Board's
structure by dividing it into two separate agencies.0 Congress
abandoned that plan when it amended the NLRA in what is
popularly known as the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, which instead
formalized the Board's informal division of power. One such
amendment created the Office of General Counsel:
There shall be a General Counsel of the Board who shall be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of
76. Ida Klaus, The Taft-Hartley Experiment in Separation of NLRB Functions, 11 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 371, 373 (1957) (citations omitted). Significantly, the author of this article, Ida
Klaus was an employee of the NLRB from 1937 through 1954 and the NLRB's Solicitor from
1948 to 1954. See id. She was "[k]nown by the press in the 1950s and 1960s as the woman 'who
thinks with a man's brain."' Suzanne Kling, Ida Klaus: 1905-1999, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JEWISH
WOMEN'S ARCHIVE, <https://jwa.org/encyclopedia/article/klaus-ida> (last visited Jun. 10, 2017).
77. Klaus, supra note 76, at 373 (citations omitted).
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 224-29 (1938) (rejecting
employer's contentions that the Board's procedures in administering the case from complaint to
hearing were constitutionally defective under the due process clause). For additional cases, see
generally Klaus, supra note 76, at 374-75 n.21.
80. See Klaus, supra note 76, at 375-77 nn.26-33 (citing legislative history of the Taft-
Hartley Act).
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the Senate, for a term of four years. The General Counsel ... shall
exercise general supervision over all attorneys employed by the
Board (other than [ALJs] and legal assistants to Board members)
and over the ... employees in the regional offices. He shall have
final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the
investigation of charges and issuance of complaints under section
160 . . ., and in respect of the prosecution of such complaints before
the Board, and shall have such other duties as the Board may
prescribe or as may be provided by law. In case of vacancy in the
office of the General Counsel the President is authorized to
designate the ... employee who shall act as General Counsel
during such vacancy, but no ... persons so designated shall so act
(1) for more than forty days when the Congress is in session unless
a nomination to fill such vacancy shall have been submitted to the
Senate, or (2) after the adjournment sine die of the session of the
Senate in which such nomination was submitted.S
This statutory grant of power authorized the General Counsel to
supervise and manage the prosecutorial functions of the Board. A
formal agreement between the Board and the General Counsel
completed the separation.8
Forty years later, the separation of the prosecutorial and
adjudicatory powers would once again become relevant. NLRB v.
United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW), Local 23,
AFL-CIO presented the question "whether a federal court has
authority to review a decision of the National Labor Relations
Board's General Counsel dismissing an unfair labor practice
complaint pursuant to an informal settlement in which the charging
party refused to join."8 3 The Court held that "such a dismissal is not
subject to judicial review. ,4
The Court based its conclusion in part on two important legal
principles. First, the General Counsel's statutory "authority" is
"final" with respect to "the investigation of charges and issuance of
complaints," and "the prosecution of such complaints before the
Board.""' Second, any "settlement [whether formal or informal] that
ultimately results in Board approval" is a final order "subject to
judicial review."8 6 The case presented an in-between scenario; namely,
81. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (2012) (emphasis added).
82. Statement of Delegation of Certain Powers of National Labor Relations Board to
General Counsel of National Labor Relations Board, 13 Fed. Reg. 654-02 (Feb. 13, 1948),
amended by 15 Fed. Reg. 1088 (Feb. 28, 1950).
83. 484 U.S. 112, 114 (1987).
84. Id.
85. See id. at 118 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 153(d)).
86. Id. at 123.
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whether a "postcomplaint, prehearing informal settlement" was
subject to judicial review. 7 The Court explained that these types of
settlements were non-appealable to the Board by its own regulations.
Those regulations were entitled to Chevron deference because they
fulfill the statute's purpose of dividing the agency's function between
the General Counsel and the Board along prosecutorial/adjudicatory
lines." Although the complaint triggers the Board's adjudicatory
function, "until a hearing is held ... no adjudication has yet taken
place."8 9 The case is an extension of the by-then well-settled rule that
the NLRB General Counsel, in his or her prosecutorial capacity, has
unreviewable discretion to issue and dismiss complaints.90 Judicial
review is, however, available for final orders issued by the Board in its
adjudicatory capacity. Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurrence,
joining the Court's opinion, and endorsing the highly deferential
standard of review set forth in Chevron.91
2. Limits on the Agency's Power to Adjudicate Cases
On January 20, 2005, President George W. Bush commenced his
second term as President, a term that would expire on January 20,
2009. The 110th United States Congress sat from January 3, 2007, to
January 3, 2009, during the final two years of the George W. Bush
presidency. During that session, the Republicans controlled the
Executive Branch, including all the administrative agencies, and the
Democrats held an operational majority in both chambers with Nancy
Pelosi, a Democrat from California, serving as Speaker of the House.
The President could only appoint Board members with the advice and
consent of the Senate. This meant that agreement on Board members
was unlikely where the Presidency and Senate were controlled by
different parties - a situation that played into the hands of ideological
conservatives opposed to unions and extreme right-wing libertarians
who were happy to witness government dysfunction.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 123-25 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-843 & n.9 (1984)).
89. Id. at 125-26 (holding "that it is a reasonable construction of the NLRA to find that
until the hearing begins, settlement or dismissal determinations are prosecutorial").
90. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 148 (1975); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171, 182 (1967).
91. See UFCW, Local 23, 484 U.S. at 133-34 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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In 2007, the NLRB had a full complement of five Board
members:
Board Member Term Party Affiliation
Robert J. Battista 12/17/02-12/16/07 Republican
Wilma B. Liebman 11/14/97-08/27/11 Democrat
Peter C. Schaumber 09/01/05-08/27/10 Republican
Peter N. Kirsanow 01/04/06-12/31/07 Republican
Dennis P. Walsh 01/17/06-12/31/07 Democrat
As anticipated, that complement did not last for very long. The
Board understood that on December 16, 2007, when Chairman
Battista's term ended, it would be down to four members - still a
quorum, but that on December 31, 2007, when Members Kirsanow's
and Walsh's recess appointments expired, the Board would be down
to two members - ostensibly not a quorum. 93 Without a quorum, the
Board could not issue decisions, which meant that it could not enforce
the NLRA, a law whose primary purpose is to "encourage[e] the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and [to] protect[] the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association."94
On December 20, 2007, the Board delegated "to Members
Liebman, Schaumber and Kirsanow, as a three-member group, all of
the Board's powers, in anticipation of the adjournment of the 1st
Session of the 110th Congress." 9 5 The Board opined that, once
Members Kirsanow and Walsh departed on December 31, 2007, this
delegation would authorize the remaining two members -
Schaumber and Liebman - to issue decisions as a two-member
quorum of a three-member group.96 The Board also delegated to the
General Counsel "continuing authority to initiate and conduct
litigation that would normally require case-by-case approval of the
Board. 97
The Board based its decision on two pieces of authority. First, it
concluded that it could delegate its authority to this three-member
group because NLRA section 3(b) said that it could. That statutory
92. See Board Members Since 1935, NLRB, <https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/
board-members-1935> (last visited Mar. 24, 2017).
93. See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 676 (2010).
94. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
95. New Process Steel, 560 U.S. at 677.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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language "authorized" the Board "to delegate to any group of three
or more members any or all of the powers which it may itself
exercise."98 The Board also based its decision on an opinion issued by
the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), the arm of the United States
Department of Justice that advises executive branch agencies, such as
the NLRB. 99 The OLC opinion explained that the Board may use its
delegation authority "to 'issue decisions during periods when three or
more of the five seats on the Board are vacant."' 00 It concluded that
"'if the Board delegated all of its powers to a group of three
members, that group could continue to issue decisions and orders as
long as a quorum of two members remained."' 1 The Board decided
that, although it was not bound to make such a delegation, it was
bound by the OLC opinion if it "'exercised its discretion' to do so."1
On March 27, 2010, President Obama made two recess
appointments to the Board - Craig Becker and Mark Pearce. 1 03 By
June 2010, the NLRB had a full complement of five Board members
once again:"
98. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b). That Section provides:
The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more members any
or all of the powers which it may itself exercise. .. . A vacancy in the Board shall
not impair the right of the remaining members to exercise all of the powers of the
Board, and three members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of
the Board, except that two members shall constitute a quorum of any group
designated pursuant to the first sentence hereof. The Board shall have an official
seal which shall be judicially noticed.
99. By delegation from the Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Office of Legal Counsel provides authoritative legal advice to the
President and all the Executive Branch agencies. The Office drafts legal opinions
of the Attorney General and also provides its own written opinions and oral
advice in response to requests from the Counsel to the President, the various
agencies of the Executive Branch, and offices within the Department. Such
requests typically deal with legal issues of particular complexity and importance or
about which two or more agencies are in disagreement. The Office also is
responsible for providing legal advice to the Executive Branch on all
constitutional questions and reviewing pending legislation for constitutionality.
Office of Legal Counsel: About the Office, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, <https://www.justice.gov/olc>
(last visited Mar. 24, 2017).
100. New Process Steel, 560 U.S. at 677.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Press Release, The White House, President Obama Announces Recess Appointments
to Key Administration Positions (Mar. 27, 2010), <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/president-obama-announces-recess-appointments-key-administration-positions>.
104. See Board Members Since 1935, supra note 92.
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Board Member Term Party Affiliation
Wilma B. Liebman 11/14/97-08/27/11 Democrat
Mark G. Pearce 04/07/10-present Democrat
Peter C. Schaumber 09/01/05-08/27/10 Republican
Brian Hays 06/29/10-12/16/12 Republican
Craig Becker 04/05/10-1/03/12 Democrat
The decision to delegate its authority to a two-member group of
a three-member quorum allowed the Board to issue over 600
decisions over twenty-seven months under the leadership of Board
Members, Peter Schaumberos and Wilma Liebman. 1 06 This was no
easy task considering that Members Schaumber and Liebman were
members of different political parties and had divergent ideological
beliefs about how the NLRA should be interpreted. Nevertheless, the
two Board members collegially worked on cases about which they
could agree. In all likelihood, these 600-plus cases were so-called easy
cases - cases that did not present a gray area of interpretation.'o7
For example, one of those 600-plus cases, New Process Steel, L.P.
v. NLRB, presented a standard contract-bar case. There the employer
withdrew recognition from a union while a valid collective-bargaining
agreement was in place.os Under well-settled law, a union enjoys an
irrebuttable presumption of majority status for the duration of a valid
collective-bargaining agreement, up to three years.1 09 The collective-
bargaining agreement thereby serves as a bar to an election for the
term of the contract up to three years.o Accordingly, an employer
violates NLRA section 8(a)(5) and (1)... when it withdraws
recognition from a union during the contract-bar period. Relying on
these long-settled principles, on September 30, 2008, the Board
(Chairman Schaumber and Member Liebman) easily found that the
employer violated the Act because it withdrew recognition during the
binding contract period.1 1 2
105. Schaumber served as Chairman for the remainder of President Bush's term, from
March 19, 2008 through January 19, 2009. See id.
106. Liebman served as Chairman once President Barack Obama took office on January 20,
2009. See id.
107. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 17 (1977).
108. New Process Steel, L.P., 353 N.L.R.B. 254 (2008).
109. Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781, 786 (1996).
110. General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962).
111. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (a)(1) (2012).
112. See New Process Steel, L.P., 353 N.L.R.B. at 255.
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At the Supreme Court level, New Process Steel presented the
question "whether, following a delegation of the Board's powers to a
three-member group, two members may continue to exercise that
delegated authority once the group's (and the Board's) membership
falls to two." 1 13 The Court, Justice Stevens writing for the majority in
which Justice Scalia joined, held that the "two remaining Board
members cannot exercise such authority."114 The Court explained:
[R]eading the delegation clause to require that the Board's
delegated power be vested continuously in a group of three
members is the only way to harmonize and give meaningful effect
to all of the provisions in § 3(b). . . . Those provisions are: (1) the
delegation clause; (2) the vacancy clause .. .; (3) the Board quorum
requirement ... ; and (4) the group quorum provision. . . .
The Court's deconstruction can be visually summarized in the
following chart (emphasis added):
The Delegation Clause "The Board is authorized to delegate to any group
of three or more members any or all of the powers
which it may itself exercise"
The Vacancy Clause "A vacancy in the Board shall not impair the right
of the remaining members to exercise all of the
powers of the Board"
The Quorum Clause "three members of the Board shall, at all times,
constitute a quorum of the Board. . ."
The Group Quorum " . . . except that two members shall constitute a
Provision quorum of any group designated pursuant to the
first sentence hereof."
The Court explained that its interpretation "gives material effect
to the three-member requirement in the delegation clause," allows
the vacancy clause to "operate[] to provide that vacancies do not
impair the ability of the Board to take action," "is consonant with"
the "quorum requirement, which requires three participating
members 'at all times' for the Board to act," and "does not render
inoperative the group quorum provision, which still ... authorize[s] a
three-member delegee group to issue a decision with only two
members participating, so long as the delegee group was properly
113. New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 676 (2010).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 680 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 153(b); other citations omitted).
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constituted."1 1 6 The Court concluded that "a straightforward under-
standing of the text, which requires that no fewer than three members
be vested with the Board's full authority, coupled with the Board's
longstanding practice, points us toward an interpretation of the
delegation clause that requires a delegee group to maintain a
membership of three.""1 . This interpretation allows two members of a
three-member panel to issue a decision when the third member must
recuse him or herself or is incapacitated, but not when the third
member's term has expired.
Justice Stevens's opinion has many of the hallmarks of Justice
Scalia's modus operandi. The opinion is formalistic, textualist, and
legalistic. As Justice Scalia explains:
Of all the criticisms leveled against textualism, the most mindless is
that it is "formalistic". The answer to that is, of course it's
formalistic! The rule of law is about form ... A murderer has been
caught with blood on his hands, bending over the body of his
victim; a neighbor with a video camera has filmed the crime and the
murderer has confessed in writing and on videotape. We
nonetheless insist that before the state can punish this miscreant, it
must conduct a full-dress criminal trial that results in a verdict of
guilty. Is that not formalism? Long live formalism. It is what makes
us a government of laws and not of men.
For Scalia, textualism, legalism (following the rules), and
formalism constrain the judge from capricious and erratic decision
making. By focusing on the text, the judge focuses on the rules. By
focusing on the rules, the judge focuses on the rule of law. And by
analyzing the case logically, by applying the rules to the specific facts
and using logic to draw a conclusion, the judge as legal official
promotes a "government of laws and not of men."
3. Limits on the President's Appointment Power
NLRB v. Noel Canning, the final case in this governmental-
authority trinity once again concerns executive power - presidential
power, in particular. The case was prompted by President Obama's
use of his constitutional recess appointment power during an intra-
session of the 112th Congress. By way of background, as of April 5,
2010, the Obama-appointed Board had a three-member quorum,
which was due to end on January 3, 2012, when Member Craig's
116. Id. at 680-81.
117. Id. at 681.
118. SCALIA, supra note 2, at 25.
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Becker's recess appointment expired.
Board Composition Immediately Before the Recess Appointments11 9
Board Member Term Party Affiliation
Mark G. Pearce 04/07/10-present Democrat
Brian Hayes 06/29/10-12/16/12 Republican
Craig Becker' 04/05/10-01/03/12 Democrat
Vacant Vacant since 08/27/11 Previously held by
Liebman (Democrat)
Vacant Vacant since 08/27/10 Previously held by
Schaumber (Republican)
This was the very same day that the 112th Congress would
convene. More specifically, the 112th Congress convened on January
3, 2011, and ended on January 3, 2013. It held two sessions -
(1) January 3, 2011 to January 3, 2012, and (2) January 3, 2012 to
January 3, 2013.120
To avoid having another quorum problem, President Obama
decided to appoint three Board members - two Democrats and one
Republican - to fill all three vacancies. The President appointed
Sharon Block, Terrance Flynn, and Richard Griffin to the Board on
January 4, 2012.121 As of that date, the Board's composition was as
follows:
122Board Composition During Recess Appointment Controversy
Board Member Term Party Affiliation
Mark G. Pearce 04/07/10-present Democrat
Brian Hayes 06/29/10-12/16/12 Republican
Sharon Block' 01/09/12-08/12/13 Democrat
Terrence F. Flynn' 01/09/12-07/24/12 Republican
Richard G. Griffin, Jr.' 01/09/12-08/12/13 Democrat
119. See Board Members Since 1935, supra note 92. The superscripted "r" denotes a recess
appointment.
120. Dates of Sessions of Congress, U.S. SENATE, <https://www.senate.gov/reference/Sess
ions/sessionDates.htm> (last visited Mar. 24, 2017).
121. Press Release, White House, President Obama Announces Recess Appointments to
Key Administration Posts (Jan. 4, 2012), <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2012/01/04/president-obama-announces-recess-appointments-key-administration-posts>.
122. See Board Members Since 1935, supra note 92. The superscripted "r" denotes a recess
appointment.
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Significantly, the President made these appointments while the
Senate was in a three-day recess under "a December 17, 2011,
resolution providing for a series of brief recesses punctuated by 'pro
forma session[s],' with 'no business ... transacted,' every Tuesday and
Friday through January 20, 2012.",123
These circumstances - intra-session appointments made during a
very brief recess - resulted in a controversy over the interpretation of
two constitutional secondary rules, to use Hart's parlance.124 Article II
of the United States Constitution authorizes the President to appoint
officers of the United States with "the Advice and Consent of the
Senate." 125 The Recess Appointments Clause creates an exception to
this rule. In particular, it grants power to the President "to fill up all
Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by
granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next
Session." 1 26 In general, then, the President has authority to appoint
important government officials "with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate." The President is normally without power to appoint
important government officials without "the Advice and Consent of
the Senate." But if a vacancy arises when the Senate is in recess, the
President may make a temporary appointment - valid only until the
end of Congress's next session, so that the government can continue
to function notwithstanding the legislative respite.
The President's recess appointments of Block, Flynn, and Griffin
during an intra-session and very brief recess period of only three days
resulted in a debate over the meaning of the Recess Appointments
Clause to determine whether those appointments were constitutional.
If unconstitutional, any decision the Board made during that time
123. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct 2550, 2556-2557 (2014) (citing S. J., 112th Cong., 1st
Sess., 923 (2011)).
124. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 79 (1994). One of Hart's most significant
contributions to legal philosophy is his distinction between primary and secondary rules.
According to Hart, law is "the union of primary and secondary rules." Id. at 107. Secondary
rules are
on a different level from the primary rules, for they are all about such rules; ...
while primary rules are concerned with the actions that individuals must or must
not do, ... secondary rules are all concerned with the primary rules themselves.
They specify the way in which the primary rules may be conclusively ascertained,
introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively
determined.
Id. at 94. Secondary rules come in three types: rules of recognition, change, and adjudication.
The constitutional rules at issue here are second-order rules of recognition, insofar as they are
rules that are used to determine the legal validity of primary rules. Id. at 94-97.
125. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
126. Id. cl. 3.
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would be void qua New Process Steel because it would mean that
there were only two valid Board members making decisions at that
time.
As with New Process Steel, the case that led the Court to resolve
this constitutional penumbra arose out of a run-of-the-mill labor
dispute in which one Pepsi-Cola distributor, Noel Canning, refused to
reduce to writing and execute a collective-bargaining agreement with
a labor union. 12 7 The company's conduct is indisputably unlawful by
the very words of the statute, which expressly requires "the execution
of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party."128 On February 8, 2012, a majority-
Republican panel of the Board (Hayes, Flynn, Block) issued its
decision, finding that the company had violated the NLRA.129
The company petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit to review the Board's decision,130
asserting that the Board's order was void ab initio either because "the
Board lacked authority to act for want of a quorum, as three
members of the five-member Board were never validly appointed
because they took office under putative recess appointments which
were made when the Senate was not in recess" or because "the
vacancies these three members purportedly filled did not 'happen
during the Recess of the Senate,' as required for recess appointments
by the Constitution." 1 31 The D.C. Circuit interpreted the clause in the
most narrow possible way, holding that the constitutional term
"recess" is limited to intersession recesses and therefore does not
extend to intra-session recesses. 1 32 Applying its constitutional
construction to the President's appointments of Block, Flynn, and
Griffin, the court explained that those appointments were void
because they were made during an intra-session recess. Because those
appointments were void, the Board was composed of only two
members, members Pearce and Hayes. Accordingly, all decisions
made by the Board during this time were void qua New Process Steel.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, affirming the D.C. Circuit
127. Noel Canning, 358 N.L.R.B. 16, 16-17, 22-23 (2012).
128. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012).
129. Noel Canning, 358 N.L.R.B. at 16, 23 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5) and (1)).
130. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (providing that review of Board decisions may be brought in the
D.C. Circuit, the circuit wherein the aggrieved party resides or transacts business, or the circuit
in which the unfair labor practice arose).
131. Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 3), aff'd but criticized, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
132. Id. at 506 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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on different grounds. The Court clarified three phrases in the Recess
Appointments Clause. First, the Court concluded that the
constitutional phrase, "Recess of the Senate,"133 referred to both "an
inter-session recess (i.e., a break between formal sessions of
Congress)" and "an intra-session recess, such as a summer recess in
the midst of a session." 134 By not limiting Senate recesses to inter-
session recesses, the Court legally expanded the President's
appointment power by ensuring that the President can keep the
administration running even when the Senate takes "substantial"
intra-session recesses, which are fairly common. 13 This holding was
consistent with past political practice and therefore had little impact
on real politics.
Second, the Court concluded that the constitutional phrase,
"Vacancies that may happen,"136 referred to both "vacancies that first
come into existence during a recess," and "vacancies that arise prior
to a recess but continue to exist during the recess." 1 37 Once again, the
Court's interpretation of this phrase legally expanded the President's
recess appointment power by allowing the President to use his or her
recess appointment power to fill vacancies whenever they arise. Once
again, this holding was consistent with the political practice.
Third, the Court concluded that, in calculating the length of a
recess, reviewing courts must include pro forma sessions. Applying
that rule in this context, the Court concluded that "the President
lacked the power to make the recess appointments here at issue,"
because the three-day recess, during which the President appointed
Block and Griffin, was "too short a time to bring a recess within the
scope of the Clause. 138 The Court's interpretation here, thereby
limited the application of this capacious presidential power.
Justice Scalia, concurring in result but disagreeing in the analysis,
would have severely limited the presidential power, by upholding the
D.C. Circuit's reasoning:
To prevent the President's recess-appointment power from
nullifying the Senate's role in the appointment process, the
Constitution cabins that power in two significant ways. First, it may
be exercised only in "the Recess of the Senate," that is, the
133. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
134. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2556 (2014).
135. Id. at 2561.
136. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
137. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2556.
138. Id. at 2557.
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intermission between two formal legislative sessions. Second, it may
be used to fill only those vacancies that "happen during the
Recess," that is, offices that become vacant during that
intermission. Both conditions are clear from the Constitution's text
and structure, and both were well understood at the founding. The
Court of Appeals correctly held that the appointments here at issue
are invalid because they did not meet either condition.13 9
Justice Scalia had two main concerns with the majority's broad
reading of the President's recess appointment power. First, in his
view, the majority's interpretation re-defined the delicate checks and
balances designed by the founding fathers to ensure structural
protection of liberty:
[T]he Constitution's core, government-structuring provisions are no
less critical to preserving liberty than are the later adopted
provisions of the Bill of Rights. Indeed, "[s]o convinced were the
Framers that liberty of the person inheres in structure that at first
they did not consider a Bill of Rights necessary." ... Those
structural provisions reflect the founding generation's deep
conviction that "checks and balances were the foundation of a
structure of government that would protect liberty." . . . It is for
that reason that "the claims of individuals - not of Government
departments - have been the principal source of judicial decisions
concerning separation of powers and checks and balances." 140
Second, Scalia was concerned with preserving the Court's
function to say what the law is:
[W]hen questions involving the Constitution's government-
structuring provisions are presented in a justiciable case, it is the
solemn responsibility of the Judicial Branch "'to say what the law
is.' . . . . This Court does not defer to the other branches'
resolution of such controversies; . .. our role is in no way
"lessened" because it might be said that "the two political branches
are adjusting their own powers between themselves.".... Since the
separation of powers exists for the protection of individual liberty,
its vitality "does not depend" on "whether 'the encroached-upon
branch approves the encroachment.'. . . . Rather, policing the
"enduring structure" of constitutional government when the
political branches fail to do so is "one of the most vital functions of
this Court." 1 4 1
Here we see Scalia's strong sense of separation of powers and his
strong views about each government branch's functions. These views
were a running theme throughout Scalia's tenure. Particularly with
respect to administrative agencies, Scalia often demonstrated great
139. Id. at 2578 (Scalia, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 2578-2593 (citations omitted).
141. Id. at 2593 (citations omitted).
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apprehension about Article I adjudicators encroaching on Article III
judicial functions. These concerns play out in the Court's statutory
interpretation cases, discussed in the section II.B., below.
4. The Administrative-Judicial Continuum
ABF Freight System, Inc.14 2 is a relatively obscure case with a
significant concurrence from Justice Scalia. There, the Court held that
the Board acted within its broad remedial discretion under Section
10(c) 14 3 in declining to adopt a categorical exception to the
reinstatement-and-backpay remedy for employees who are
discharged because of union animus, where such employees give false
testimony under oath in an administrative hearing before an
administrative law judge.1 4 4
Justice Scalia concurred in judgment but wrote separately to
discuss what he viewed as the Board acting not well within its broad
remedial discretion but at "the very precipice of the tolerable": 1 45
It is ordinarily no proper concern of the judge how the Executive
chooses to exercise discretion, so long as it be within the scope of
what the law allows.... The context changes, however, when the
exercise of discretion relates to the integrity of the unitary
adjudicative process that begins in an administrative hearing before a
federal administrative law judge and ends in a judgment of this or
some other federal court. Agency action or inaction that undermines
and dishonors that process undermines and dishonors the legal
system - undermines and dishonors the courts. Judges may
properly protest, no matter how lawful and hence unreversible) the
agency action or inaction may be. Such a protest is called for in the
present case, in which the Board has displayed - from its initial
decision through its defense of that decision in this Court - an
unseemly toleration of perjury in the course of adjudicative
146proceedings.
Justice Scalia's commentary, admittedly dicta, is important for
two reasons. First, it foreshadows the Court's attitude toward
undocumented workers as having "unclean hands" and therefore not
entitled to backpay in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB.147
142. ABF Freight System, Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317 (1994).
143. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2012) (authorizing the Board "to take such affirmative action
including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of
[the Act]").
144. ABF Freight System, Inc., 510 U.S. at 324-25.
145. ABF Freight System, Inc., 510 U.S. at 329 (Scalia, J., concurring).
146. ABF Freight System, Inc., 510 U.S. at 326-27 (emphasis added).
147. See infra notes xx-xx and accompanying text discussing Hoffman Plastic Compounds,
Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
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Second, it highlights the importance that Justice Scalia places on the
judicial branch and the extent to which the three powers, while
separated by function, do interact in significant ways.
B. Chevron and the Court's Relationship to the NLRB in Interpreting
the NLRA
The vast majority of labor cases decided by the Court during
Scalia's tenure were cases testing the relationship between the
reviewing courts and the NLRB, primarily under Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,148 and its progeny.
The Chevron line of cases decrees that, when an administrative
agency interprets the statute that Congress charged it with
administering, reviewing courts must defer to the agency's reasonable
and permissible interpretations of gaps and ambiguities in that
statute. 14 9 For purposes of private-sector labor law, this means that
courts reviewing NLRB decisions must defer to the Board's
reasonable and permissible interpretation of ambiguous NLRA
language.
Although the Court decided Chevron in 1984, a full two years
before Justice Scalia's appointment to the High Bench, reviewing
courts had been deferring to administrative agencies' statutory
interpretations since the New Deal. Thus, while Chevron has proven
controversial in academic circles, its principle is long-settled law.
Scalia, a former administrative law professor and a former judge on
the D.C. Circuit, which routinely reviews agency decisions, would
have been intimately familiar with these administrative law principles.
1. Not All Workers Are Statutory Employees Entitled to
Statutory Remedies
The most significant Chevron cases decided during Scalia's
tenure dealt with the question whether a particular category of
worker was a statutory employee under the NLRA. The answer to
this question is important because the NLRA only protects those
workers who meet the statutory definition of employee.so Between
1994 and 2002, the Court decided five cases in this category."' In only
148. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
149. Id. at 843.
150. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
151. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137. 151-52 (2002) (upholding
the Board's construction of the statutory term employee as including undocumented workers
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one of those cases, Town & Country Electric,152 did Scalia side with
those seeking to maintain the strikingly broad definition of
employee. 15 3 Although Justice Breyer - not Scalia - drafted the
opinion in that case, it captures much of Scalia's essence - his literal,
textual approach to statutory interpretation, his legalism, and his
formalism.
a. Salts Are Employees Protected Under the NLRA Because a
Literal Reading of the Statutory Term, Employee, Reveals that It Is
Strikingly Broad
In Town & Country Electric, the Court unanimously held that a
saltl5 - a worker paid by a union to work at a nonunion shop to
legally organize its workers - was an employee under NLRA section
2(3).' In so holding, the Court took four approaches to analyzing the
case: literal/textual, purposive, jurisprudential/precedential, and
structural. Providing a textualist analysis first, the Court observed
that including salts within the statutory definition of employee as
"any employee," unless otherwise exempted, would be consistent
but finding that federal immigration law prohibited the Board from awarding backpay as a
remedy); NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 721 (2001) (holding that the
Board's construction of the statutory term "independent judgment" is not reasonable); Holly
Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 408-09 (1996) (upholding the Board's conclusion that live-
haul workers were employees entitled to the statutory protections of the NLRA rather than
being exempted agricultural workers); NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 87
(1995) (upholding the Board's construction of the statutory term employee as including paid
union organizers); NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 584 (1994)
(holding that Board's construction of the statutory term, "in the interest of the employer" is not
a reasonable interpretation of the NLRA).
152. 516 U.S. at 85.
153. "The Supreme Court has characterized the statutory definition of 'employee' as very
'broad."' Anne Marie Lofaso, The Persistence of Union Repression in an Era of Recognition, 62
ME. L. REV. 199, 205 (2010) (citing Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. at 91; NLRB v. Action
Auto., Inc., 469 U.S. 490, 497-98 (1985); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984)).
154. See Jane Slaughter, Organizers Worth Their Salt, LABORNOTES (Feb. 26, 2014), <http://
www.labornotes.org/2014/02/organizers-worth-their-salt>.
155. 516 U.S. at 96. The NLRA defines employee as
any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer,
unless [the Act] explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose
work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor
dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any
other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any
individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any
family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse,
or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual
employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to
the Railway Labor Act.
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
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with the breadth of the definition.156 Reviewing dictionary definitions
of that term highlighted its breadth as describing essentially anyone in
the service of another.1 7 The Court then noted that no exceptions
applied in the circumstances of this case.' Second, the Court
observed that the Board's broad construction of the term employee to
include salts was consistent with several of the Act's purposes. In
particular, it fulfilled the purpose of "protecting 'the right of
employees to organize for mutual aid without employer
interference,"' 15 9 and "'encouraging and protecting the collective-
bargaining process."' 16 0 Third, the Court explained that the Board's
construction was consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence,
whereby the Court had consistently remarked on the "breadth of §
2(3)'s definition [a]s striking: the Act squarely applies to 'any
employee."' 161 Fourth, the Court remarked that the 1947 Labor
Management Relations Act contemplated that workers can serve
both a union and work for a company.1
The Court readily rejected the company's arguments. In
particular, the Court rejected the policy argument, allegedly
grounded in the common law, that salts could not be employees
because they could never be loyal to the employer. The Court
explained that the common law actually did not support this
position. 16 In any event, at least with respect to Scalia, given the
language's breadth, which includes all workers unless expressly
exempted, it would have been hard for the strict textualist to have
found otherwise.
156. Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. at 97.
157. Id. at 90.
158. Id. at 98.
159. Id. at 91 (quoting Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945) and
citing 29 U.S.C. § 157).
160. Id. at 91 (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984)).
161. Id. at 91-92 (quoting Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 891 and collecting the following cases in
which the Court upheld various categories of workers as statutory employees: Sure-Tan, 467
U.S. at 891 (undocumented aliens); NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp.,
454 U.S. 170, 189-90 (1981) ("confidential employees" unless they deal with personnel matters);
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 185-86 (job applicants)).
162. Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. at 91-92 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(1)).
163. A "'person may be the servant of two masters ... at one time as to one act, if the
service to one does not involve abandonment of the service to the other." Town & Country
Elec., 516 U.S. at 94-95 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 226 (1958)) (emphasis
omitted).
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b. Scalia Would Have Expanded the Agricultural Laborer Exemption
Based on a Textualist Analysis of FLSA Section 3(f)
and NLRA Section 2(3)
Scalia was not so hard pressed in the next statutory construction
case, which rather than focusing on the affirmative aspects of the
definition employee focused on the negative aspects of that definition
comprising the exemptions. In Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, the
Court examined the agricultural laborer exemption in the context of
holding that live-haul workers, "chicken catchers, forklift operators,
and truck drivers, who collect for slaughter chickens" and transport
them to a processing plant were employees within the meaning of
Section 2(3)."M
The Board's construction of the statutory term, agricultural
laborer, is more circumscribed than usual. The term "agricultural
laborer" is not defined in the NLRA, which would suggest that the
Board's construction would receive Chevron-like deference.1 65 And
164. 517 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1996).
165. Although Chevron was not decided until 1984, the Court generally deferred to the
Board's reasonable interpretation of the NLRA in what I call pre-Chevron Chevron cases. See,
e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984) ("Since the task of defining the term
'employee' is one that 'has been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to
administer the Act,' ... the Board's construction of that term is entitled to considerable
deference, and we will uphold any interpretation that is reasonably defensible."); NLRB v. City
Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 829 (1984) ("[O]n an issue that implicates its expertise in labor
relations, a reasonable construction by the Board is entitled to considerable deference."); Bill
Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 742 (1983) ("[I]n light of the Board's special
competence in applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life,
its interpretations of the Act are entitled to deference, even where, as here, its position has not
been entirely consistent."); NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 402-03 (1983) ( "[T]he
Board's construction here, while it may not be required by the Act, is at least permissible under
it...', and in these circumstances its position is entitled to deference."); Charles D. Bonanno
Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 419 (1982) ("[T]he Board in this case has developed a
rule which, although it may deny an employer a particular economic weapon, does so in the
interest of the proper and pre-eminent goal, maintaining the stability of the multiemployer unit.
Because the Board has carefully considered the effect of its rule on that goal, we should defer to
its judgment."); Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1979) ("[T]he judgment of the
Board is subject to judicial review; but if its construction of the statute is reasonably defensible,
it should not be rejected merely because the courts might prefer another view of the statute.");
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 568 (1978) ("[The task of defining the scope of section 7] is
for the Board to perform in the first instance as it considers the wide variety of cases that come
before it."); Beth Israel Hosp. v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 483, 500 (1978) ("[T]he Board's
construction of the statute's policies would be entitled to considerable deference."); NLRB v.
Local Union No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 434 U.S.
335, 350 (1978) ("The Board's resolution of the conflicting claims in this case represents a
defensible construction of the statute and is entitled to considerable deference."); NLRB v.
Enter. Ass'n of Steam, Hot Water, Hydraulic Sprinkler, Pneumatic Tube, Ice Mach. & Gen.
Pipefitters, Local Union No. 638, 429 U.S. 507, 528 (1977) ("The Board's reading and
application of the statute involved in this case, however, are long established, have remained
undisturbed by Congress, and fall well within that category of situations in which the courts
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indeed, that's exactly what happened for the first decade of the
Board's construction of that term.166 But starting in 1946, Congress
constrained the Board in how it may interpret the term.1 67 In
should defer to the agency's understanding of the statute which it administers."); NLRB v. J.
Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975) ("[T]he Board has the 'special function of applying
the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life,' ... and its special
competence in this field is the justification for the deference accorded its determination.");
NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 75 (1973) ("[A] consistent and contemporaneous
construction of a statute by the agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to great
deference by the courts"); NLRB v. Nat. Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins Cry., Tenn., 402 U.S. 600,
605 (1971) ("The Board's construction of the broad statutory term [political subdivision] is, of
course, entitled to great respect."); Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965)
("There is of course no question that the Board is entitled to the greatest deference in
recognition of its special competence in dealing with labor problems."); NLRB v. Erie Resistor
Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963) (Where Congress has in the Statute given the Board a question
to answer, the courts will give respect to that answer."); NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union
No 449, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs Warehousemen, & Helpers of Am., 353 U.S. 87, 96
(1957) ("The ultimate problem is the balancing of the conflicting legitimate interests [between
management and labor]. The function of striking that balance to effectuate national labor policy
is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the
National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review."); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951) ("[T]he Board's interpretation of the Act and
the Board's application of it in doubtful situations are entitled to weight."); Republic Aviation
Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945) (explaining that the Wagner Act "left to the Board the
work of applying the Act's general prohibitory language in the light of the infinite combinations
of events which might be charged as violative of its terms"); NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S.
111, 131 (1944), superseded by statute, Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley
Act), ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 137 ("[W]here the question is one of specific application of a broad
statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must determine it
initially, the reviewing court's function is limited."); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177,
194 (1941) ("The exercise of the process [of determining remedy] was committed to the Board,
subject to limited judicial review. Because the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter
for administrative competence, courts must not enter the allowable area of the Board's
discretion and must guard against the danger of sliding unconsciously from the narrow confines
of law into the more spacious domain of policy.").
166. For example, in Idaho Potato Growers, Inc., the Board held that "warehouse and cellar
crews" were not agricultural laborers because the
services of these employees are not rendered in the fields. Their work looks not
toward the production of potatoes but toward their marketing. Their services are
devoted entirely to the sorting of potatoes, and their grading, weighing, sacking,
preparation for shipment, and loading. The work is of such a nature that it can be
done in the dealer's warehouse as well as in the farmer's cellar.
48 N.L.R.B. 1084, 1094-95 (1943), enforced sub nom., Idaho Potato Growers v. NLRB, 144 F.2d
295, 301 (9th Cir. 1944). In North Whittier Heights Citrus Ass'n, in the context of holding that
packing-house workers who handled fruit were not agricultural laborers, the Board explained:
that an individual is engaged in handling farm products does not of itself make the
services performed by him "agricultural." Services are often performed by
employees in connection with the packing, processing, and other preparation of
farm products for sale to consumers which are not a part of ordinary farming
operations but a part of commercial or manufacturing operations.
10 N.L.R.B. 1269, 1281 (1939), enforced sub nom., N. Whittier Heights Citrus Ass'n v. NLRB,
109 F.2d 76, 81 (9th Cir. 1940); see NLRB v. Edinburg Citrus Ass'n, 147 F.2d 353, 354 (5th Cir.
1945) (holding that employees of a co-operative that packed its own fruit were not agricultural
laborers).
167. See Kirsten Zerger, The NLRA Agricultural Exemption: A Functional or Mechanical
Approach, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 131, 137-42 (1977).
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particular, in annual riders to appropriations acts for the NLRB since
1946, Congress has instructed that "'agricultural laborer,' for NLRA §
2(3) purposes, shall derive its meaning from the definition of
'agriculture' supplied by § 3(f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 (FLSA)," 1 6 8 which defines "agriculture" as:
[F]arming in all its branches and among other things includes the
cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairying, the production,
cultivation, growing, and harvesting of any agricultural, or
horticultural commodities, . .. raising of livestock, bees, furbearing
animals, or poultry, and any practices ... performed by the farmer
or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming
operations, including preparation for market, delivery to storage or
to market or to carriers for transportation to market.
This complication presents two legal questions: (1) to what
extent may the Board interpret or deviate from the FLSA section 3(f)
definition?70 and (2) what deference do reviewing courts owe the
Board in how it incorporates the FLSA section 3(f) definition of
agriculture into NLRA section 2(3)'s use of the term, "agricultural
laborer"? The Board has taken the view that it should read FLSA
section 3(f)'s definition of agriculture as narrowly as possible."' The
Holly Farms majority deferred to the Board's narrow construction of
section 3(f), much as it would any legislative term subject to
disambiguation."
Although a unanimous court held that the truck drivers were
statutory employees, the Court split five to four on the other two
categories of live-haul workers - the chicken catchers and the forklift
operators. Justice O'Connor, writing an opinion dissenting in
pertinent part in which Justice Scalia joined, would have expanded
the "agricultural laborer" exemption to include these particular
workers.173 Once again, we see Scalia's influence in the dissent's
168. Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 397 (1996) (Bayside Enters., Inc. v. NLRB,
429 U.S. 298, 300 & n.6 (1977)); see Pub. L. No. 94-206, 90 Stat. 23 (1976), available at <http://us
code.house.gov/statutes/pl/94/206.pdf>.
169. 29 U.S.C. § 203(f) (2012).
170. This question is also raised in Zerger, supra note 167, written nearly two decades
before Holly Farms.
171. Holly Farms, 517 U.S. at 399 (noting that "administrators and reviewing courts must
take care to assure that exemptions from NLRA coverage are not so expansively interpreted as
to deny protection to workers the Act was designed to reach"); see id. (citing Arnold v. Ben
Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960) (exemptions from the FLSA "are to be narrowly
construed against the employers seeking to assert them"); Mitchell v. Ky. Fin. Co., 359 U.S. 290,
295 (1959) ("It is well settled that exemptions from the Fair Labor Standards Act are to be
narrowly construed.")).
172. Id. at 409.
173. Id. at 411 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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analysis.
The dissent commenced its discussion with Chevron's standard of
review, but emphasized prong one: "First, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.
If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress." 174 Rather than considering what leeway
the Board had in incorporating FLSA section 3(f)'s definition of
agriculture into its analysis of the "agricultural laborer" exemption,
the dissent reviewed the text of FLSA section 3(f), because "the
coverage intended by Congress under both the FLSA and the NLRA
is best determined by consulting the language of the statute at
issue"17 ' The dissent then concluded that "because the relevant
portions of § 3(f) are perfectly plain and 'directly [speak] to the
precise question at issue,' I would hold that the chicken catchers and
forklift operators are agricultural laborers and that the Board's
contrary conclusion does not deserve deference." 1 76
c. Scalia Joined the Majority in Holding that Many Nurses Are
Supervisors under NLRA Section 2(11) and Therefore Not Protected
In an infamous pair of cases, the Court rejected the Board's
definition of the supervisory exemption found in NLRA section
2(11), which excludes workers from protection where workers use
"independent judgment" that is not "routine" or "clerical" when they
exercise any one of twelve enumerated powers17 7 ("or effectively to
recommend such action") "in the interest of the employer."17 Those
cases are NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America1 7 9 and
NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc.so
In Health Care & Retirement, Justice Kennedy, writing for the
five to four majority that included Justice Scalia, rejected the Board's
interpretation of the statutory phrase, "in the interest of the
employer.". 1 The Board previously had held that "a nurse's direction
174. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984).
175. Holly Farms, 517 U.S. at 410-11.
176. Id. at 411 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842).
177. Those powers are: "to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their
grievances." 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2012).
178. Id.
179. 511 U.S. 571 (1994).
180. 532 U.S. 706 (2001).
181. 511 U.S. at 576.
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of less-skilled employees, in the exercise of professional judgment
incidental to the treatment of patients, is not authority exercised 'in
the interest of the employer."'182 The Court took a textualist
approach, explaining that the Board's construction of the supervisory
exemption - that nurses do not exert power "in the interest of the
employer" but rather in the interest of "patient care" - was
inconsistent with the plain language of section 2(11) because patient
care is the employer's interest. In the Court's words:
[T]he Board has created a false dichotomy - in this case, a
dichotomy between acts taken in connection with patient care and
acts taken in the interest of the employer. That dichotomy makes
no sense. Patient care is the business of a nursing home, and it
follows that attending to the needs of the nursing home patients,
who are the employer's customers, is in the interest of the
employer.... We thus see no basis for the Board's blanket
assertion that supervisory authority exercised in connection with
183patient care is somehow not in the interest of the employer.
The issue returned to the Court a few years later after the Board
clarified the term supervisor by distinguishing between independent
judgment that is supervisory in nature, which makes a worker an
exempt supervisor, and professional judgment, use of which does not.
In particular, the Board excluded "ordinary professional or technical
judgment in directing less-skilled employees to deliver services" from
the definition of "independent judgment." 18 4 In Kentucky River, the
Court unanimously agreed that the Board's interpretation of the
ambiguous term "independent judgment" is normally entitled to
deference."' Nevertheless, the Court struck down the Board's
definition as contrary to the plain language of that term and therefore
not permissible under Chevron prong two. Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, observed that, the Board's interpretation inserted "a
startling categorical exclusion into statutory text that does not suggest
its existence."186 By striking down the Board's distinction, the Court
punched a gaping hole in the definition of employee, making it
difficult for professional workers, who often use professional
182. Id. at 574.
183. 511 U.S. at 577-78.
184. See Providence Hosp., 320 N.L.R.B. 717, 729 (1996), enforced sub nom., Providence
Alaska Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 121 F.3d 548 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Section 2(11) supervisory authority
does not include the authority of an employee to direct another to perform discrete tasks
stemming from the directing employee's experience, skills, training, or position").
185. 532 U.S. at 726.
186. Id. at 714.
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expertise to direct others, to meet that definition.1 7
d. Undocumented Workers Have Section 7 Rights but No Remedy
It has been a part of American jurisprudence from its inception
that the law provides remedies for harms inflicted. In Marbury v.
Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall presaged that the "very essence
of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury" and
counselled that the newly minted United States government would
cease to be called a "government of laws, and not of men .... if the
laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.""'
The importance of the maxim - the law must remedy all breaches
of legal rights - is nowhere more important than in the context of the
most vulnerable members of our society. After all, the law nearly
always protects the privileged. The law loses its moral authority when
it fails the most vulnerable.189 Yet this is precisely what happened in
Hoffman Plastic Compounds. There, Justice Rehnquist writing for the
majority held that, although under Supreme Court precedent
undocumented workers were statutory employees,1 90 they were not
entitled to backpay when their employers (who illegally hired them
under immigration law) unlawfully fired them for exercising their
right to organize.1 91 Although Scalia silently joined the majority, he
was not so silent at oral argument.192 There, Scalia infamously
remarked that, because an undocumented worker cannot legally work
in the U.S. and therefore cannot mitigate the harm caused by his or
her employer's unlawful conduct, a "smart" undocumented worker
would simply "sit home," "eat chocolates," and collect "back pay."1 93
187. Anne Marie Lofaso, The Vanishing Employee: Putting the Autonomous Dignified
Worker Back To Work, 5 F.I.U. L. REV. 495, 534-43 (2010).
188. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). For an excellent history of the development of this
maxim, see Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to A Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309
(2003).
189. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN,
DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA (1999); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990).
190. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891-94 (1984).
191. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149-51 (2002) (upholding the
Board's construction of the statutory term employee as including undocumented workers but
finding that federal immigration law prohibited the Board from awarding backpay as a remedy).
192. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 137 (No.
00-1595), available at <https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/00-
1595.pdf>.
193. Id. at 31-32.
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Those remarks provoked ridicule from labor scholars.194 Remarking
on Justice Scalia's commentary, I wrote:
Scalia's view of people who are so impoverished that they risk life
or limb to cross the border into the U.S. for the opportunity to
work rightly provoked ridicule from labour scholars.
Labour law's purpose is to promote the practice of collective
association among workers.... When justices use word games to
thwart that purpose, justice is denied.195
To be fair, Justice Scalia was known for his banter on the bench.
But the rub here is severe. Immigrants cross borders for work.
Certainly the undocumented workers who are the subject of unfair
labor practices are crossing the border for work. The fact that they
may, in crossing those borders, break the positive law of the receiving
country says nothing about that person's moral virtue as a person.
These undocumented workers, now labelled illegal aliens, are only
criminals in the sense that they broke U.S. domestic law, which makes
a noncitizen's improper entry in the United States punishable by fine
or imprisonmentl akin to a Class B misdemeanor for a first offense
and a Class E felony for a subsequent offense." But this act alone -
improper entry into the U.S. to seek work - is hardly criminal in
nature. Indeed, it is often virtuous - a person risking personal security
so that his or her family back in the mother country can survive. And
it is closer to a parent stealing a loaf of bread or medicine for his or
her starving or sick children than it is to other Class B misdemeanors,
such as driving while intoxicated, or Class E felonies, such as driving
while intoxicated resulting in harm to an individual.198
2. Allentown Mack: The Prominence of Textualism and Formalism in
Scalia's Non-Chevron Chevron Case
In Allentown Mack Sales and Service, Inc. v. NLRB,1 99 Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, reviewed the Board's test for
determining whether a successor employer had a reasonable good-
194. See, e.g., Ellen Dannin & Ann Hodges, The So-called Strict Constructionist Justices:
Lessons from Hoffman Plastic, TRUTHOUT (Sept. 5, 2013), <http://www.truth-out.org/news/
item/18296-the-so-called-strict-constructionist-justices-lessons-from-hoffman-plastics>; Timothy
R. Koch, Beware the Bonbon Eating, L.J. FOR Soc. JUST. (Oct. 27, 2010), <https://ljsj.word
press.com/2010/10/27/beware-the-bonbon-eating-immigrants/>.
195. See Lofaso, supra note *.
196. See 18 U.S.C. § 1325 (2012).
197. See id. § 3559.
198. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 17C-5-2 (2016) (laying out penalties for driving under the
influence of alcohol or while impaired by drugs).
199. 522 U.S. 359 (1998).
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faith doubt of a union's majority status.200 In establishing the standard
of review, Scalia used pre-Chevron language to state the deference
owed to the Board's construction of the NLRA, explaining that
"[c]ourts must defer to the requirements imposed by the Board if
they are 'rational and consistent with the Act,' . . . and if the Board's
'explication is not inadequate, irrational or arbitrary. ,201
Using that test, the Court upheld the Board's test:
While the Board's adoption of a unitary standard for polling,
RM elections, and withdrawals of recognition is in some
respects a puzzling policy, we do not find it so irrational as to
be "arbitrary [or] capricious" within the meaning of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. The Board
believes that employer polling is potentially "disruptive" to
established bargaining relationships and "unsettling" to
employees, and so has chosen to limit severely the
circumstances under which it may be conducted.
Given that Allentown Mack was decided fourteen years after
Chevron, it may seem odd for the Court not to cite the seminal case
for judicial deference to an administrative agency's interpretation of
203the statute that Congress charged that agency with administering.
This is, however, in line with Justice Scalia's contempt for Chevron as
creating a serious separation-of-powers question:
Heedless of the original design of the APA, we have developed an
elaborate law of deference to agencies' interpretations of statutes
and regulations. Never mentioning § 706's directive that the
"reviewing court . . . interpret . . . statutory provisions," we have
held that agencies may authoritatively resolve ambiguities in
204
statutes .
In Justice Scalia's view, Chevron allows administrative agencies
to evade the more stringent standard that the APA had in mind.
200. Id. at 367-71. Justice Scalia also reviewed whether substantial evidence supported the
Board's factual findings as applied in that test. Id. at 377-79.
201. Id. at 364 (quoting Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 42
(1987), and NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963)).
202. Id. at 364-65.
203. To be fair, the Court has only cited Chevron in nine Board cases since it was decided in
1984. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 161 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); NLRB v. Kentucky River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 713 (2001); Holly Farms
Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 398, 410-11, 413-14 (1996); NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc.,
516 U.S. 85, 90 (1995); ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 324 (1994); Lechmere, Inc.
v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536-37 (1992); Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 614 (1991);
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,
574 (1988); NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, AFL-CIO, 484
U.S. 112, 123 (1987).
204. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211 (2015) (emphasis in original)
(citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984)).
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For Scalia, reasoned decision making was of paramount
importance, including and perhaps especially in the agency context:
The Administrative Procedure Act, which governs the proceedings
of administrative agencies and related judicial review, establishes a
scheme of "reasoned decisionmaking." .. . Not only must an
agency's decreed result be within the scope of its lawful authority,
but the process by which it reaches that result must be logical and
rational. Courts enforce this principle with regularity when they set
aside agency regulations which, though well within the agencies'
scope of authority, are not supported by the reasons that the
agencies adduce.
The value that Scalia placed on reasoned decision making fit well
with his judicial philosophy of formalism and legalism. For Scalia, it
was imperative to get the legal rules and the internal logic right. Both
were necessary; neither was sufficient. Allentown Mack captures that
philosophy like no one other labor law case. Justice Scalia essentially
told the Board, "Hey dummies, you barely got the rule right. Your
interpretation is strange but not so irrational that we can't defer to
you on it. But you misapplied it in this context. Try again." The Board
took Scalia's opinion to heart. In Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pacific,
Inc., the Board held that "an employer may unilaterally withdraw
recognition from an incumbent union only where the union has
actually lost the support of the majority of the bargaining unit
employees." 206 In so holding, the Board "overrule[d] Celanese2W and
its progeny insofar as they permit withdrawal on the basis of good-
faith doubt." 208 Under this standard, an employer can defeat a post-
withdrawal refusal-to-bargain allegation "if it shows, as a defense, the
union's actual loss of majority status."209 In this way, Justice Scalia's
formalism and textualism served a useful purpose by compelling the
Board to clarify its standard.
205. Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc., 522 U.S. at 374 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn.
of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983); SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U. S. 194 (1947); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80 (1943)).
206. 333 N.L.R.B. 717,717 (2001).
207. Celanese Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951).
208. Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. at 717.
209. Id.
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3. The Limits of Chevron Deference: Plain Language (Textualism), an
Agency's Interpretation of Supreme Court Jurisprudence, and the
Problem with Flawed Precedent Serving as Faulty
Premises (Formalism)
Given Scalia's concerns about Chevron, it should come as no
surprise that Scalia would want to clarify that Chevron deference is
not owed to agency interpretations of the Court's cases. NLRB v.
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), Local 340
represents such a case.210 There, the Court held, in disagreement with
the Board, that a union does not violate NLRA section 8(b)(1)(B)
when it disciplines two union members who worked as supervisors for
an employer that did not have a collective-bargaining agreement with
the union.211 The Board had previously interpreted section
8(b)(1)(B)'s prohibition on union "restrain[t] or coerc[ion]" of "an
employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of
collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances,"212 as permitting
unions to discipline supervisory members when engaging in
collective-bargaining or grievance adjustment activities. 2 13 The Board
extended section 8(b)(1)(B)'s reach here to cases where a union did
not even have a collective-bargaining agreement with the employer,
on the theory that a union's enforcement of a "no-contract-no-work
rule against its supervisor-members would restrain or coerce
[employers] by affecting the way in which the supervisor members
performed their § 8(b)(1)(B) tasks and by restricting the selection of
§ 8(b)(1)(B) representatives." 2 14 The Court disagreed, holding that
because the union here did not have a collective-bargaining
agreement with the employer, the union's discipline of its supervisory
members did not trigger section 8(b)(1)(B).215
Scalia wrote separately for three reasons. First, Scalia
emphasized his agreement with the Court that section 8(b)(1)(B), by
its plain terms, governs the relationship between unions and
210. See NLRB v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers (IBEW), Local 340, 481 U.S. 573, 596 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring); see also Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190 (1991) (the
majority and both dissenting opinions agreed that the Board is not entitled to deference in
interpreting the Supreme Court's case, Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Bakery Workers, 430 U.S. 243
(1977)).
211. IBEW, Local 340, 481 U.S. at 579.
212. 29 U.S.C § 158(b)(1)(B) (2012).
213. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790, 800-
01 (1974) (collecting Board decisions).
214. IBEW, Local 340, 481 U.S. at 589.
215. Id. at 595-96.
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employers (not the relationship between unions and their members)
and only one aspect of that relationship - the employer's selection of
representatives.2 1 6 Second, Scalia explained that any deference owed
to the NLRB was owed to its interpretation of ambiguous terms of or
gaps in the NLRA, not in its interpretation of the Court's own case
law:
If the question before us were whether, given the deference we owe
to agency determinations, the Board's construction of this Court's
opinion in ABC is a reasonable one, I would agree with the
Government that it is. We defer to agencies, however (and thus
apply a mere "reasonableness" standard of review) in their
construction of their statutes, not of our opinions. The question
before us is not whether ABC can reasonably be read to support
the Board's decision, but whether § 8(b)(1)(B) can reasonably be
read to support it. It seems to me that ABC and the Board's prior
decision in [San Francisco-Oakland Mailers' Union No. 18], which
held that unions violate § 8(b)(1)(B) by disciplining member-
representatives for the manner in which they interpret collective-
bargaining contracts, represent at best the "outer limits," [Florida
Power & Light Co.], of any permissible construction of §
8(b)(1)(B). I would certainly go no further, and would accordingly
limit the Board's indirect restraint theory to circumstances in which
there is an actual contract between the union and affected
employer, without regard to whether the union has an intent to
establish such a contract. Of course, as the Court's opinion points
out: "Direct coercion [i.e., real coercion] of an employer's selection
of a § 8(b)(1)(B) representative would always be a § 8(b)(1)(B)
violation, whether or not the union has or seeks a bargaining
relationship with an employer." 2 17
Scalia's third point is perhaps the most important because it
reveals Scalia's adherence to both textualism and formalism.
The Board's approach is the product of a familiar phenomenon.
Once having succeeded, by benefit of excessive judicial deference,
in expanding the scope of a statute beyond a reasonable
interpretation of its language, the emboldened agency presses the
rationale of that expansion to the limits of its logic. And the Court,
having already sanctioned a point of departure that is genuinely not
to be found within the language of the statute, finds itself cut off
from that authoritative source of the law, and ends up construing
not the statute but its own construction. Applied to an erroneous
point of departure, the logical reasoning that is ordinarily the
mechanism of judicial adherence to the rule of law perversely
carries the Court further and further from the meaning of the
216. Id. at 596 (Scalia, J., concurring).
217. Id. at 597 (citing Am. Broad. Cos. v. Writers Guild, Inc., 437 U.S. 411 (1978) (ABC);
San Francisco-Oakland Mailers' Union No. 18 (Northwest Publications, Inc.), 172 N.L.R.B.
2173 (1968); and Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790, 805 (1974)).
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statute. Some distance down that path, however, there comes a
point at which a later incremental step, again rational in itself, leads
to a result so far removed from the statute that obedience to text
must overcome fidelity to logic.218
Justice Scalia is essentially saying this. In a previous case, the
Court deferred to the Board's stretched construction of the NLRA
(an interpretation that nearly flies in the face of the plain language).
Accordingly, although the Board's extension in this case may be
logical, it is too far removed from the plain language as to be
enforceable: "Logic is on the side of the Board, but the statute is with
the respondent." 2 19
Although it appears that textualism is trumping formalism here,
that is not the case. What Scalia is really saying is that the Board's
previous interpretations were wrong because they violated the
NLRA's plain language or at the outer limits of statutory construction
such that any more extension would conflict with the NLRA's plain
language. When the Board applied those cases here, its internal logic
may have been correct but it relied on erroneous assumptions in the
form of previous cases wrongly decided or at least off the mark. The
Board's decision thereby fell apart in much the same way that a
mathematical proof that begins with faulty premises would fall apart
even with impeccable logic.
4. Clash of the Titans: Tension Between Textualism
and Chevron Deference
In theory, there should be no tension between Chevron and
textualism. After all, Chevron demands that the Court first ask
whether Congress has directly spoken to the issue. If so, and the
language is plain, then the agency and reviewing courts must give
effect to the plain language of the statute. Under Chevron prong one,
courts reign supreme. Deference is not even an issue unless the
reviewing court determines that the statute is ambiguous or silent. In
that case, courts must defer to the agency's reasonable and
permissible construction.
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB presents an excellent account for how
these seemingly compatible doctrines might clash in the world of
extreme textualism. In that case, nonemployee union organizers
trespassed on a company parking lot to try to organize the company's
218. Id. at 597-98.
219. Id. at 598.
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employees.220 The Board applied its Jean Country test:
"[I]n all access cases our essential concern will be [1] the degree of
impairment of the Section 7 right if access should be denied, as it
balances against [2] the degree of impairment of the private
property right if access should be granted. We view the
consideration of [3] the availability of reasonably effective
alternative means as especially significant in this balancing
process."2 2 '
Lechmere presented a fact pattern similar to NLRB v. Babcock
& Wilcox Co.22 2 But intervening law since Babcock & Wilcox,
including, two Supreme Court cases, Central Hardware Co. 2 2 3 and
Hudgens,224 suggested that the balance to be struck between Section 7
rights and an employer's property rights fell on a continuum, the
locus of which depended on the context of the case. All of this was
pointed out by the dissent, which would have upheld the Board's
construction of Section 7.225
Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for a majority that included
Justice Scalia, saw the case very differently. In an opinion, which
reads like a poor-man's effort at channeling Scalia, Justice Thomas
used three main statutory canons to explain the Court's holding that
nonemployee union organizers normally do not have access to an
employer's property: (1) statutory language; (2) Supreme Court
precedent; (3) stare decisis. First, Justice Thomas commenced with a
statement of the text of Section 7, which makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to "interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of [their Section 7 rights],"226 explaining
that, "[b]y its plain terms,... the NLRA confers rights only on
employees, not on unions or their nonemployee organizers." 2 27
Second, the Court reviewed four relevant Supreme Court cases. It
initially reviewed Babcock & Wilcox, in which the Court "recognized
220. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 529-30 (1992).
221. Id. at 536 (quoting Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11, 14 (1998)).
222. See id. at 532 (discussing NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
223. See Cent. Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 544 (1972) (explaining that Babcock
was a "guiding principle" for adjusting conflicts between employees' section 7 rights and
employers' property rights).
224. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 522 (1976) (explaining that "[t]he locus of that
accommodation ... may fall at differing points along the spectrum depending on the nature and
strength of the respective § 7 rights and private property rights asserted in any given context. In
each generic situation, the primary responsibility for making this accommodation must rest with
the Board in the first instance").
225. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 543-44 (White, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 531 (majority opinion) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988) (emphasis added)).
227. Id. at 532.
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that insofar as the employees' 'right of self-organization depends in
some measure on [their] ability . .. to learn the advantages of self-
organization from others,' . . ., § 7 of the NLRA may, in certain
limited circumstances, restrict an employer's right to exclude
nonemployee union organizers from his property."228 The Court next
distinguished Central Hardware and Hudgens. To be sure, the Court
acknowledged that both cases "quoted approvingly Babcock's
admonition that accommodation between employees' § 7 rights and
employers' property rights 'must be obtained with as little destruction
of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other."' 2 29 It
proceeded to explain, however, that "[t]here is no hint in Hudgens
and Central Hardware ... that our invocation of Babcock's language
of 'accommodation' was intended to repudiate or modify Babcock's
holding that an employer need not accommodate nonemployee
organizers unless the employees are otherwise inaccessible." 23 0 The
Court then relied on dicta in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters,231
which explained Babcock & Wilcox as follows:
"While Babcock indicates that an employer may not always bar
nonemployee union organizers from his property, his right to do so
remains the general rule. To gain access, the union has the burden
of showing that no other reasonable means of communicating its
organizational message to the employees exists or that the
employer's access rules discriminate against union solicitation. That
the burden imposed on the union is a heavy one is evidenced by the
fact that the balance struck by the Board and the courts under the
Babcock accommodation principle has rarely been in favor of
trespassory organizational activity. 232
Third, the Court relied on the doctrine of stare decisis to explain
why it was sticking with its holding in Babcock & Wilcox, rather than
deferring to the Board's construction of section 7 in Jean Country:
Before we reach any issue of deference to the Board, however, we
must first determine whether Jean Country - at least as applied to
nonemployee organizational trespassing - is consistent with our
past interpretation of § 7. "Once we have determined a statute's
clear meaning, we adhere to that determination under the doctrine
of stare decisis, and we judge an agency's later interpretation of the
statute against our prior determination of the statute's meaning." 233
228. Id. at 532 (quoting NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956)).
229. Id. at 534 (citing Cent. Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 544 (1972) and Hudgens,
424 U.S. at 521, 522 (quoting Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 112)).
230. See Id. at 534.
231. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
232. Lechmere, Inc., 502 U.S. at 535 (quoting Sears, 436 U.S. at 205).
233. Id. at 536-37 (quoting Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131
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Notwithstanding this three-part approach - statutory language,
Supreme Court case law, and stare decisis - the take away point here
is textualism. As the Court explained: "In Babcock,... we held that
the Act drew a distinction 'of substance' . . . between the union
activities of employees and nonemployees." 2 34
Here's where an obsession with the statutory text becomes
problematic. Lechmere is perhaps the worst reasoned opinion of all
the NLRB cases during Scalia's tenure (perhaps of all time). Scalia's
formalism takes pride in its strict adherence to the internal logic of
the opinion's reasoning. Lechmere essentially takes the language of
section 7, which grants positive rights to employees, and greatly
diminishes the role that unions play in securing those rights. The
NLRA's preamble explains:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of
commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when
they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
* 235mutual aid or protection.
Although employees are the primary holders of section 7 rights,
those rights cannot be understood absent the role that unions, self-
organization, full freedom of association, collective bargaining, and
other concerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid or protection
play in securing those rights. Like a law school student who reads
only part of the case to grasp the holding only to learn that he has
unwittingly read the dissent, Lechmere eviscerates the fundamental
meaning of the NLRA as granting collective as well as individual
rights.
Lechmere is also wrong on its own terms. As the Court
recognized in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB,236 the statutory term "'employees'
who may engage in concerted activities for 'mutual aid or protection'
are defined by § 2(3) of the Act ... to 'include any employee, and
shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer .... '
This definition was intended to protect employees when they engage
in otherwise proper concerted activities in support of employees of
(1990)).
234. Id. at 37 (quoting Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 113).
235. See 29 U.S C. § 151 (2012).
236. 437 U.S. 556 (1978).
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employers other than their own."2 3 7 Reading Section 7 in light of
Section 2(3)'s definition of employee renders Section 7's grant of
positive rights to employees ambiguous at best. This places Section 7
in the Lechmere context - that is, the context as to whether
nonemployee union organizers have some trespassory rights to
communicate with employees on those employees' own employer's
private property - squarely within the Board's interpretative powers
under Chevron prong two.
C. The Court's Review of the Board's Findings of Fact
1. History of the Making of the Substantial Evidence Test in the
NLRA Context
NLRA sections 10(e) and 10(f) 23 8 empower the United States
courts of appeals to review the Board's final decisions and orders.
Section 10(e) also provides the standard by which those courts must
review the Board's findings of fact: "The findings of the Board with
respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on
the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive." 2 3 9
NLRA section 10(e) of the original Wagner Act required only
that the Board's factual findings were to be "supported by evidence"
to "be conclusive."240 Shortly thereafter, the Court inserted
"substantial" into the courts' determination whether the Board's
findings were supported by evidence. In particular, the Court first
mentioned "substantial evidence" in dicta in Washington, Virginia &
Maryland Coach Co. v. NLRB, where it explained that it was without
jurisdiction to review the factual findings because "[t]he petition for
certiorari made no mention of any claim with respect to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings. In the light of this
237. Id. at 564.
238. Id. §§ 160(e), (f). Sections 10(e) and (f) grant jurisdiction to various courts to hear
cases, known as applications for enforcement and petitions for review, regarding the
enforceability of the Board's orders. Section 10(e) grants a "power" to the Board "to petition
any court of appeals of the United States ... wherein the unfair labor practice in question
occurred or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for the enforcement of such order
and for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order...." Section 10(f) permits "[a]ny
person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole or in part the relief
sought [to] obtain a review of such order in any United States court of appeals in the circuit
wherein the unfair labor practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein
such person resides or transacts business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, by filing in such court a written petition praying that the order of the
Board be modified or set aside."
239. Id. § 160(e).
240. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1940).
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fact the question is not open for decision here. But, were this not so,
we [would apply the substantial evidence test]."241 This was the birth
of the substantial evidence test in the labor context.
The Court squarely defined "substantial evidence" in the context
of an NLRB case the very next year in Consolidated Edison Co. of
New York v. NLRB.242 There the Court explained that substantial
evidence is "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." 2 4 3 The following year, after explaining that the Board's
findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence,
the Court elaborated:
But as has often been pointed out, this, as in the case of other
findings by administrative bodies, means evidence which is
substantial, that is, affording a substantial basis of fact from which
the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. .. .Substantial evidence
is more than a scintilla, and must do more than create a suspicion of
the existence of the fact to be established. 24
In line with language defining substantial evidence as "do[ing]
more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact," the Fifth
Circuit began to deny enforcement of Board decisions and orders for
lack of substantial evidence.245 As a recurring federal issue of "high
importance," the Court took certiorari to clarify the standard:
The Court below, upon petition ... to set aside an order of the
[NLRB], decided that the Board's order was not supported by
substantial evidence, said the order was based on mere suspicion,
and declined to enforce it. Whether the court properly reached that
conclusion is the single question here. We do not ordinarily grant
certiorari to review judgments based solely on questions of fact. In
its petition, however, the Board earnestly contended that the
record before the Court of Appeals had presented "clear and
overwhelming proof" that the [company] had been guilty of a most
flagrant mass discrimination against its employees in violation of
the [NLRA], and that the court had unwarrantedly interfered with
246the exclusive jurisdiction granted the Board by Congress.
Accordingly, the Court took this particular case because "[i]t is
of paramount importance that courts not encroach upon this
241. 301 U.S. 142, 146-47 (1937).
242. 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
243. Id. at 229.
244. NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 299-300 (1939).
245. See NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206, 208 n.1 (1940) (citing NLRB v. Bell
Oil & Gas Co., 98 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1938); Peninsular & Occidental S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 98 F.2d
411 (5th Cir. 1938); Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1939)).
246. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. at 207-08 (citation omitted).
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exclusive power of the Board if effect is to be given the intention of
Congress to apply an orderly, informed and specialized procedure to
the complex, administrative problems arising in the solution of
industrial disputes." 2 47 The Court viewed this issue as a separation-of-
powers question: "Congress has deemed it wise to entrust the finding
of facts to these specialized agencies. It is essential that courts regard
this division of responsibility which Congress as a matter of policy has
embodied in the very statute from which the Court of Appeals
derived its jurisdiction to act." 248
In 1947, Congress amended NLRA section 10(e) in two ways.
First, Congress inserted the word, "substantial" before the word,
"evidence," ostensibly adopting the "substantial evidence" standard
adopted by the Court in Consolidated Edison. Second, Congress
inserted the words, "on the record as a whole." The appellate
standard of review of the Board's factual findings thereby changed as
follows:
Wagner Act 1935 Language249 Taft-Hartley 1947 Language250
"The findings of the Board as to the "The findings of the Board with
facts, if supported by evidence, shall respect to questions of fact if
be conclusive." supported by substantial evidence on
the record considered as a whole
shall be conclusive."
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB 2 5 1 was the first case in which
the Supreme Court reviewed the amended standard. There, the Court
identified two criticisms that resulted in Congress amending the
NLRA's language. First, the Court determined that the standard of
proof reviewing courts expected of the NLRB (in contrast with other
administrative agencies) was not sufficiently rigorous. The Court
concluded that Congress, in response, added the statutory term,
"substantial," to ensure that the evidence supporting the agency's
factual findings were, in fact, substantial. In putting that standard in
the context of the legislative amendments, the Court added, "[a]nd so
247. Id. at 208.
248. Id. at 208-09.
249. National Labor Relations Act, § 10(e), 49 Stat. 449, 454 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §
160(e) (1940)).
250. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat.
137, 147 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)).
251. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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we hold that the standard of proof specifically required of the
[NLRB] by the Taft-Hartley Act is the same as that to be exacted by
courts reviewing every administrative action subject to the
Administrative Procedure Act." 25 2 Second, the Court repeated
congressional concerns that some judges were only superficially
reviewing the record in search of "substantial evidence," without
accounting for countervailing evidence. In the perception of at least
some members of Congress, this nonsystematic method of reviewing
the record resulted in "inconsistency and uncertainty." 25 3 To remedy
this problem, Congress added the words, "on the record considered as
a whole," to ensure the "kind of scrutiny which a court of appeals
must give the record before the Board to satisfy itself that the Board's
order rests on adequate proof." 25 4
Having identified these criticisms and having explained just how
Congress dealt with these criticisms, the Court then did some back
peddling, in defense of the administrative state:
To be sure, the requirement for canvassing "the whole record" in
order to ascertain substantiality does not furnish a calculus of value
by which a reviewing court can assess the evidence. Nor was it
intended to negative the function of the [NLRB] as one of those
agencies presumably equipped or informed by experience to deal
with a specialized field of knowledge, whose findings within that
field carry the authority of an expertness which courts do not
possess and therefore must respect. Nor does it mean that even as to
matters not requiring expertise a court may displace the Board's
choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court
would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been
before it de novo. Congress has merely made it clear that a
reviewing court is not barred from setting aside a Board decision
when it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting
that decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the record
in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to
the Board's view.255
It further back peddled in defense of its own institution: "From
this it follows that enactment of [Taft-Hartley and the APA] does not
require every Court of Appeals to alter its practice. Some - perhaps a
majority - have always applied the attitude reflected in this
legislation." 2 5 6
252. Id. at 487.
253. Id. at 481, 487.
254. Id. at 487.
255. Id. at 488 (emphasis added).
256. Id. at 490.
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The Court ended its discussion explicating its own role reviewing
Board findings of fact vis-%-vis the courts of appeals:
Our power to review the correctness of application of the present
standard ought seldom to be called into action. Whether on the
record as a whole there is substantial evidence to support agency
findings is a question which Congress has placed in the keeping of
the Courts of Appeals. This Court will intervene only in what ought
to be the rare instance when the standard appears to have been
257
misapprehended or grossly misapplied.
Over the next sixty-five years, the Court demonstrated that it
meant what it said - that Congress placed the substantial evidence
test "in the keeping of the Courts of Appeal" and that its own "power
to review the correctness of the [lower courts'] application of [that
standard] ought seldom to be called into action." The Court invoked
the words "substantial evidence" in precisely forty-two NLRB
cases. 258 Most of those cases simply applied the standard to uphold the
257. Id. at 490-91.
258. See BE & K Const. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 524, 538 (2002); Allentown Mack Sales
& Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 361, 366, 372, 376-80 (1998); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502
U.S. 527, 541, 547 (1992); Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 619 (1991); NLRB v. Curtin
Matheson Sci., Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 797 (1990); id. at 801-05, 812-13, 815-16, 818 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 35, 42, 44 (1987); NLRB
v. Int'1 Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO, 473 U.S. 61, 72, 78 (1985); id. at 93 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 748 (1983); NLRB v. Transp.
Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 405 (1983); NLRB v. Hendricks Cry. Rural Elec. Membership Corp.,
454 U.S. 170, 191 (1981); NLRB v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO, 447 U.S. 490, 529
(1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 782, 785-86, 790
(1979); NLRB v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 439 U.S. 9, 9 (1978) (per curiam); Beth Israel Hosp. v.
NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 501, 507 (1978); id. at 510 (Powell, J., concurring); Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v.
Writers Guild of Am., W., Inc., 437 U.S. 411, 433, 438 (1978); NLRB v. Enter. Ass'n of Steam,
Hot Water, Hydraulic Sprinkler, Pneumatic Tube, Ice Mach. & Gen. Pipefitters of N.Y. &
Vicinity, Local Union No. 638, 429 U.S. 507, 520, 522, 528, 531 (1977); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co. Div. of Textron, 416 U.S. 267, 273 (1974); NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270, 289
(1973); Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 172-73 (1973); Cent. Hardware Co. v.
NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 548 (1972); Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. 1 v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157, 171 (1971); Magnesium Casting Co. v.
NLRB, 401 U.S. 137, 143 (1971); NLRB v. J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 267 (1969)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 586 (1969); NLRB v. Great
Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 35 (1967); id. at 40 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Nat'l Woodwork
Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 646 (1967); Houston Insulation Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB,
386 U.S. 664, 667-68 (1967); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291-92 (1965); Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v.
NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 308 (1965); id. at 318, 326 (White, J., concurring); id. at 335-36, 341
(Goldberg, J., concurring); NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21, 22 n.2 (1964); NLRB v.
Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963); NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9,
15 (1962); NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 406 (1962); id. at 409-10, 415, 417
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); NLRB v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp., 368 U.S. 318, 320 n.3 (1961);
Local Lodge No. 1424 v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 417 n.6, 421 n.13 (1960); NLRB v. United
Steelworkers of Am., CIO, 357 U.S. 357, 366 (1958) (Warren, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part); Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., AFL v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93,
96 n.1 (1958); Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of Am. AFL-CIO v. NLRB,
352 U.S. 153, 157 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149,
157 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
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Board's findings of fact.259 One case was remanded to court of appeals
to apply the substantial-evidence test.260  One of those cases
admonished the court of appeals for not fulfilling its duty to defer to
the Board's findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence on
the record as a whole.261 One of those cases upheld the lower court's
finding that the Board's factual findings lacked substantial evidence.262
When the Court rejected the Board's conclusion, it was often because
of a misapplication of the law or an erroneous legal foundation, as
opposed to insufficiency of the evidence.263 A few of those cases cited
Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956); Radio Officers' Union of Commercial Telegraphers Union, AFL
v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 29, 33, 48, 50(1954); id. at 60 & n.4 (Black, J., dissenting); NLRB v.
Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 691 (1951).
259. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., 522 U.S. at 372; Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 499 U.S. at 619;
Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 482 U.S. at 44; Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. at 405;
Hendricks Cty. Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. at 191; Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 439 U.S.
at 9 (not reaching the question); Beth Israel Hosp., 437 U.S. at 501; Am. Broad. Cos., 437 U.S. at
433; Enter. Ass'n of Steam, Hot Water, Hydraulic Sprinkler, Pneumatic Tube, Ice Mach. & Gen.
Pipefitters, 429 U.S. at 531-32; Golden State Bottling Co., 414 U.S. at 172-73; Magnesium Casting
Co., 401 U.S. at 143; Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 586 (rejecting lower court's conclusion that
the Board's factual findings were not supported by substantial evidence); Great Dane Trailers,
Inc., 388 U.S. at 35; Nat'l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n, 386 U.S. at 645-46; Houston Insulation
Contractors Ass'n, 386 U.S. at 666-68; Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. at 22-23 n.2 (not reaching
the question); Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. at 235-37; Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. at
15-16; Ochoa Fertilizer Corp., 368 U.S. at 320 n.3; Local Lodge No. 1424, 362 U.S. at 416; Local
1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., AFL, 357 U.S. at 96 n.1 (not reaching the
question); Radio Officers' Union of Commercial Telegraphers Union, 347 U.S. at 48-50; Denver
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. at 691-92.
260. See Cent. Hardware Co., 407 U.S. at 547-48; see also Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 586
(reversing lower court's conclusion that the Board's factual findings were not supported by
substantial evidence).
261. See Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. at 406-09.
262. See Baptist Hosp., 442 U.S. at 785-87 (upholding lower court's conclusion that Board's
finding that company failed to justify its solicitation ban lacked substantial evidence, but
reversing lower court's conclusion that other factual findings lacked substantial evidence).
263. See Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 473 U.S. at 79 (upholding the Board's factual findings
but explaining that "the Board committed two fundamental [legal] errors"); Bill Johnson's
Rests., Inc., 461 U.S. at 748 ("[B]ecause, in enforcing the Board's order, the Court of Appeals
ultimately relied on the fact that 'substantial evidence' supported the Board's finding that the
prosecution of the lawsuit violated the Act, 660 F.2d, at 1343, the Board's error has not been
cured."); Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 272-73 ("[A]gree[ing] with the Court of Appeals below
that the Board 'is not now free' to read a new and more restrictive meaning into the Act" and
explaining that "the case must be remanded to permit the Board to apply the proper legal
standard in determining the status of these buyers"); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. at 171-
72 ("[T]he Board's findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive.... But
the Board's powers in respect of unit determinations are not without limits, and if its decision
'oversteps the law,'. .. it must be reversed."); Am. Ship Bldg. Co., 380 U.S. at 308 ("[W]e put to
one side cases where the Board has concluded on the basis of substantial evidence that the
employer has used a lockout as a means to injure a labor organization or to evade his duty to
bargain collectively."); id. at 318 (White, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court applies legal standards
that cannot be reconciled with decisions of this Court defining the Board's functions in applying
these sections of the Act and does so without pausing to ascertain if the Board's factual
premises are supported by substantial evidence."); Brown, 380 U.S. at 292 (quoting Am. Ship
Bldg. Co., 380 U.S. at 318) ("Of course due deference is to be rendered to agency
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to the substantial evidence test in a dissent or concurrence in a
264
noncontroversial manner.
2. Scalia's Use of the Substantial Evidence Test
Of the five substantial-evidence cases decided during Scalia's
265tenure, three are noteworthy for what Justice Scalia had to say.
First, in NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., Scalia showcased
the myopia of his formalism. There, in the context of determining
whether an employer had a good-faith doubt of majority status during
a strike when the majority of current employees were striker
replacement workers, the Court upheld as reasonable the Board's
rule that it would not adopt a presumption that striker replacements
were against the union.2 66 Justice Scalia dissented, and would have
held that such a non-presumption is really fact-finding in policy-
making disguise. 267 Because Scalia simply could not believe that
determinations of fact, so long as there is substantial evidence to be found in the record as a
whole. But where, as here, the review is not of a question of fact, but of a judgment as to the
proper balance to be struck between conflicting interests, '[t]he deference owed to an expert
tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia which results in the unauthorized
assumption by an agency of major policy decisions properly made by Congress."'); Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. at 112-13 (1956) ("The determination of the proper adjustments rests with
the Board. Its rulings, when reached on findings of fact supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole, should be sustained by the courts unless its conclusions rest on erroneous
legal foundations. Here the Board failed to make a distinction between rules of law applicable
to employees and those applicable to nonemployees.").
264. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 547 (1992) (White, J., dissenting) ("The
Board's conclusion as to reasonable alternatives in this case was supported by evidence in the
record. Even if the majority cannot defer to that application, because of the depth of its
objections to the rule applied by the Board, it should remand to the Board for a decision under
the rule it arrives at today, rather than sitting in the place Congress has assigned to the Board.");
NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Sci., Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 797 (1990) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The
Court of Appeals did not consider, free from the use of any presumption, whether there was
substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support the Board's determination here, and I
believe that is a question best left for the Court of Appeals on remand."); id. at 801 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 447 U.S. at 529 (Burger, J., dissenting); NLRB v. Savair
Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270, 289 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. at
266-68 (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); NLRB v. United Steelworkers of Am.,
357 U.S. 357, 365 (1958) (Warren, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part); Amalgamated Meat
Cutters & Butcher Workmen of Am. AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 352 U.S. 153, 157 (1956)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 157-58 (1956)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). But see BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB,
536 U.S. 516, 538 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. at 40 (Harlan, J.
dissenting) (explaining that the dissent would have overturned the Board's factual findings as
not supported by substantial evidence).
265. See BE & K Constr. Co., 536 U.S. at 516; Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB,
522 U.S. 359 (1998); Lechmere, Inc., 502 U.S. at 527; Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606
(1991); NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Sci., Inc., 494 U.S. 775 (1990).
266. Curtin Matheson Sci., Inc., 494 U.S. at 788-89.
267. Id. at 812-13, 818 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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striker replacement workers would support the union, that factual
finding was not supported by substantial evidence.
Second, in Allentown Mack Sales and Service, Inc. v. NLRB,
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, reviewed the question whether
substantial evidence supported the Board's factual findings as applied
to the following question: Did the successor employer have a good-
faith reasonable doubt as to the Union's majority status such that it
268
was lawful for it to poll its employees to determine majority status.
As a precursor to determining the factual question, the Court
reviewed and upheld the Board's rule whereby employers with a
good-faith reasonable doubt as to a union's majority status may (1)
request a Board-conducted secret-ballot election to test majority
status, (2) poll their employees for the express purpose of
determining majority status, or simply (3) withdraw recognition.269
Having concluded that the Board's good-faith reasonable doubt
test was itself reasonable, the Court moved to the question whether
substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that antiunion
statements by approximately six of Allentown's thirty-two employees
were sufficient to create an objective reasonable doubt of union
majority support.270 "Put differently, we must decide whether on this
record it would have been possible for a reasonable jury to reach the
Board's conclusion."271 The Court ultimately answered in the
negative: "The Board's finding to the contrary rests on a refusal to
credit probative circumstantial evidence, and on evidentiary demands
that go beyond the substantive standard the Board purports to
apply." 27 2
The Court's conclusion, that a reasonable jury would never reach
this conclusion and therefore substantial evidence does not support
the Board's finding, turns on the Court's interpretation of the words,
"doubt" and "uncertainty." In particular, the Court used ordinary
dictionary meanings of these words to reject the Board's assertion
that "the word 'doubt' may mean either 'uncertainty' or 'disbelief,'
and that its polling standard uses the word only in the latter sense." 2 73
268. 522 U.S. at 361.
269. The Court deferred to the Board's construction of that test in the context of a poll. Id.
at 364. For an in-depth discussion, see supra notes 199-209 and accompanying text.
270. Id. at 368-69.
271. Id. at 366-67.
272. Id. at 368.
273. Id. at 367 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 776 (2d ed.1949)
(def. 1: "A fluctuation of mind arising from defect of knowledge or evidence; uncertainty of
judgment or mind; unsettled state of opinion concerning the reality of an event, or the truth of
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The Court added, "If the subject at issue were the existence of God,
for example, 'doubt' would be the disbelief of the agnostic, not of the
atheist." 274
Accepting the Board's apparent (and in our view inescapable)
concession that Allentown received reliable information that 7 of
the bargaining-unit employees did not support the union, the
remaining 25 would have had to support the union by a margin of
17 to 8-a ratio of more than 2 to 1-if the union commanded majority
support.... The Board cannot covertly transform its presumption
of continuing majority support into a working assumption that all of
a successor's employees support the union until proved otherwise.
Giving fair weight to Allentown's circumstantial evidence, we think
it quite impossible for a rational factfinder to avoid the conclusion
that Allentown had reasonable, good-faith grounds to doubt - to be
275
uncertain about - the union's retention of majority support.
Showcasing his deep commitment to formalism, Scalia shows
why he cannot give the Board a pass on the substantial evidence test:
The question arises, then, whether, if that should be the situation
that obtains here, we ought to measure the evidentiary support for
the Board's decision against the standards consistently applied
rather than the standards recited. As a theoretical matter . . . , the
Board could certainly have raised the bar for employer polling or
withdrawal of recognition by imposing a more stringent
requirement than the reasonable-doubt test, or by adopting a
formal requirement that employers establish their reasonable doubt
by more than a preponderance of the evidence. Would it make any
difference if the Board achieved precisely the same result by
formally leaving in place the reasonable-doubt and preponderance
standards, but consistently applying them as though they meant
something other than what they say? We think it would.276
For Scalia, calling a test by one name but then doing something
else, even if that something else is done consistently, is like scratching
the blackboard. It doesn't matter that the Board might very well
accept the remand and just rename its test - which is what it
essentially did do - it was Scalia's job to clean up the Board's illogical
mess.
an assertion, etc."); 1 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 734 (1993) (def. 1:
"Uncertainty as to the truth or reality of something or as to the wisdom of a course of action;
occasion or room for uncertainty"); AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 555 (3d ed.1992) (def.
1: "A lack of certainty that often leads to irresolution")).
274. Id. at 367.
275. Id. at 371.
276. Id. at 373-74.
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3. Scalia's Substantial Evidence Test: Aftermath
Four years after Allentown Mack was decided, Justice Scalia
wrote a separate concurring opinion in another case, B E & K
Construction Company v. NLRB. There, the Court held that an
employer's unsuccessful lawsuit against a union or its members in
retaliation for their union activity was not unlawful under the NLRA,
absent the additional finding that the employer's lawsuit was
objectively baseless.277 In so holding, the Court reversed the Sixth
Circuit's enforcement of the Board's decision that it was unlawful for
an employer to sue a union or its members in retaliation for their
protected activity regardless of the merits of the lawsuit.2 78 Justice
Scalia wrote separately to clarify two points. First, "the implication of
our decision [in B E & K] is that, in a future appropriate case, we will
construe the [NLRA] in the same way we have already construed the
Sherman Act: to prohibit only lawsuits that are both objectively
baseless and subjectively intended to abuse process."279 This is
significant. Retaliation against unions or those they represent because
of their union activities is normally unlawful. But in this context, the
Court recognized that it must balance employees' section 7 rights
against the employers' First Amendment right to file a law suit.
Hence, the balance struck - no protection for employees unless the
lawsuit is objectively baseless. Second and relatedly, Scalia clarified
that this balanced result is more important in the NLRB context
because the entity making the finding of retaliation is not an Article
III court but an Article I agency:
Under the Sherman Act, the entity making the factual
determination whether the objectively reasonable suit was brought
with an unlawful motive would have been an Article III court; even
with that protection, we thought the right of access to Article III
courts too much imperiled. Under the NLRA, however, the entity
making the factual finding that determines whether a litigant will be
punished for filing an objectively reasonable lawsuit will be an
executive agency, the [NLRB].... At the very least, [this
difference] poses a difficult question under the First Amendment:
whether an executive agency can be given the power to punish a
reasonably based suit filed in an Article III court whenever it
concludes - insulated from de novo judicial review by the
substantial-evidence standard. . . - that the complainant had one
277. BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 536-377 (2002).
278. BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 246 F.3d 619, 630-31 (6th Cir. 2001), rev'd 536 U.S. 516
(2002).
279. See BE & K Const. Co., 536 U.S. at 537 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Prof'1 Real
Estate Inv'rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993)).
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motive rather than another. This makes resort to the courts a risky
venture, dependent upon the findings of a body that does not have
the independence prescribed for Article III courts. It would be
extraordinary to interpret a statute which is silent on this subject to
intrude upon the courts' ability to decide for themselves which
280postulants for their assistance should be punished.
IV. CONCLUSION
A. Summary
I recall my law professor, Clyde Summers, once telling our
Employment Law class that a failure to take into consideration the
purposes of a social-justice statute, such as the NLRA or the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (about which he was referring),
is judicial activism. It frees the courts from at least one standard - the
purpose standard - which may confine its interpretation of statutory
language. Ironically, and contrary to Scalia's plea that formalism
keeps the rule of man in check, Scalia's focus on textualism expands
judicial capacity to interpret statutory text. In particular, it usurps the
legislative function by ignoring statutory purpose language that the
legislator intentionally enacts to cabin judicial and agency
interpretation on vague statutory language. Cloaked with legalism
(logical analysis) and formalism (application of legalism to specific
facts), Scalia has sometimes erased the very purpose of the statutory
text, often forsaking law's humanity. Logic and reasoning were his
forte; storytelling and empathy were not. This formalistic approach
often meant that justice was denied for many workers, such as the
undocumented workers of Hoffmann Plastic, whom Scalia
characterized at oral argument as "eat[ing] chocolates" while
"sit[ting] home" waiting for a "back pay" check.281 That day, humanity
was forsaken.
280. Id. at 538.
281. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
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B. Closing Thoughts
No man is an island,
Entire of itself,
Every man is a piece of the continent,
A part of the main.
If a clod be washed away by the sea,
Europe is the less,
As well as if a promontory were,
As well as if a manor of thy friend's
Or of thine own were:
Any man's death diminishes me,
Because I am involved in mankind,
And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls;
It tolls for thee.282
- John Donne
From our years together at the D.C. Circuit, we were best buddies.
We disagreed now and then, but when I wrote for the Court and
received a Scalia dissent, the opinion ultimately released was
notably better than my initial circulation. Justice Scalia nailed all
the weak spots - the "applesauce" and "argle bargle" - and gave
283
me just what I needed to strengthen the majority opinion.
- Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
On February 13, 2016, the sea washed away this judicial
promontory. There were no labor law cases decided that day. Indeed,
as he died peacefully in his Texas hotel room early Saturday morning,
it is likely that no law was made on that day. But just as there was law
before Scalia, there continues to be law after him. While he was here
on this earth, Scalia stood upon the shoulders of other great jurists,
law makers, jurisprudes, and legal practitioners to build a
jurisprudence that obsessed over textualism, legalism, and formalism
in a manner that sometimes left behind the humanity of law. His strict
adherence to logic meant that those who disagreed with him, whether
in the majority or in the dissent, made better arguments. So while
282. See John Donne, Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions, and Severall Steps in My
Sicknes, MEDITATION XVII (1624), available at <http://www.online-literature.com/donne/409/>.
283. Elisha Fieldstadt & Pete Williams, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Justice Antonin
Scalia: "We Were Best Buddies." NBC NEWS (Feb. 14, 2016), <http://www.nbenews.com/news/
us-news/justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-justice-antonin-scalia-we-were-best-n518671>.
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Justice Scalia's jurisprudence sometimes resulted in justice denied, it
also resulted in tidying up the law as an analytical pursuit.
To be sure, the clods of this world are often less concerned with
the niceties of analytical thinking and more with the end results of a
just system. For this, Justice Scalia can be faulted. He was insensitive
to undocumented workers, for example, and often placed form over
substance. But, as Justice Ginsberg pointed out, he made the
opposition stronger. For that, we all should be grateful. For these
reasons, the bell tolls not only for this great jurist, the promontory,
but for all the rest of us clods, for together we constitute our
American legal system and we make that system better, stronger, and
eventually ... more just.
